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«JI a mm i •!•,«• ii 1 i — 
During the past two decades the rapid growth and geographical 
redistribution of the population of most Latin American countries have 
increasingly forced themselves on public attention as problems demanding 
a more adequate understanding and some kind of policy consistent with 
o v e r a l l development policy and with national conceptions of a viable 
future social order« Extremely divergent views on the meaning of these 
phenomena and what should ba dona about them continue to be advanced, 
and much of the information that would be reeded to verify essential 
aspects of the different hypotheses continues to be lacking or of dubious 
reliability». Nevertheless* the prolonged polemics have contributed to 
a better appreciation of the complexity of the factors involved and the 
inadequacy of the simply complacent as well as the simply denunciatory 
approaches. The researches carried out by the Latin American Demographic 
Centre (CELADE) and by increasing members of other institutions and 
scholars have done a great deal, even in the face of baffling inadequacies 
in the basic data and a continuing failure on the part of most 
Governments to allocate adequate resources to the collection of demographic 
statistics, to clarify present trends and permit trustworthy projections 
of the future. 
In August 1970, the f i rst Latin American Regional Population 
Conference ^ assembled nearly 200 papers discussing and reporting on 
research concerning fert i l i ty , mortality, migration, urbanization and 
1/ Held in Mexico, D.F.j co-sponsored by the International Union for 
the Scientific Study of Population, the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, the Latin American Demographic Centre, and the 
Colegio de México. Titles cited below without references to place 




regional distribution of population; relationships between population 
and economic and social development future population trends, population 
policies, and the state of demographic research and teaching in Latin 
America. These papers, presenting an extremely wide range of theories, 
opinions and empirical data, provide a favourable opportunity for an 
overview of the trepidation question in Latin America, advancing beyond 
2/ 
previous studies»-*' The beginning of a new decade, sxpeot**! to serve 
as a framework for the formulation of j.ong^te^i deveS^^vt strategies, 
makes such an overview particularly necessary« However, the fact that 
most countries are conducting their decennial censuses in 1970 or X971 
means that i t i s not worthwhile to accompany this o v e r v i e w by detailed 
recent 'statistics* For the most pert, the demographic statistics and 
projections now at hand derive from the I960 censuses, and are readily 
available in other publications« 
The following pages will f i rs t summarize very briefly the present 
demographic situation of Latin America, giving particular attention to 
the likelihood of continuity or important change in the past trends 
that necessarily serve as bas es for statistical projections of the 
demographic future and to the light thrown on these questions by the 
preliminary data now becoming available from some of the new censuses. 
It wi l l then discuss the main social and economic factors that have been 
identified as exerting a significant influence on population change and 
i 
that, at the same time, are influenced or constrained by population 
change. It will here be necessary to cover a wide range of topics on 
which there is no consensus among authorities. In several instances, 
i t will not be possible to do more than summarize the arguments that 
have been advanced and express a tentative preference based on ECLA*s 
general diagnosis of development problems and requisites. The crucial 
question of policy formulation will then be explored. An attempt will 
be made to summarize objectively the relevant ideological positions,, 
2/ See First Part Economic Survey of Latin America 1969 and 
Chapter XVIII in Social Change and Social Development Policy 




Finally, the need to give population policy a legitimate and clearly defined 
place within a long-term development strategy, will be confronted with the 
need to realistic criteria for what the Government can justifiably do or 
rafrain from doing while they are s t i l l struggling to evolve such a 
strategy* In population as in all the other areas of public social action, 
commitments are now being made, programmes are gaining momentum, and 
pressures are being generated that will not wait until the State is ready 
and able to integrate them into a comprehensive strategy* 
3/ 
2© The present situation and the foreseeable future ^ 
a ) Rates of increase arid their determinants 
A country ?s over-all rate of populatiox* increase has three immediate 
determinants - the rates of fer t i l i ty , of mortality, and of migration across 
its borders. For Latin America as a whole, i t is generally agree that 
the major possible variations and the main incognita as to future population 
growth as well as age composition depend on the f irst of these variables. 
There is ample room far further lowering of mortality rates, i f 
these are compared with the rates attained by high-income countries. 
Future declines are expected to be relatively slow compared with the recent 
past, but in their effects on over-all rates of increase should be at 
least sufficient to offset initial declines in fertility«^Only a few of 
the smaller and poorer countries s t i l l have the potentiality of very 
large declines over a period of a few years that produced, for the region 
2/ For a more detailed discussion of the questions treated in this 
section and supporting statistics, see Chapter IV in Social Change 
and Social Development Policy in Latin America, op.cit as well as 
the papers of the Regional Conference. 
y For the region as a whole, a decline in the gross death rate from 
10.0 in 1965-1970 to 7.0 in 1980-1985 is projected. The expectation 
of l i f e at birth should rise by 6.5 years between the same periods. 
Projected trends for individual countries differ widely from the 
regional average. At one extreme, the gross death rate of Argentina 
would rise lightly, from 8.6 to 9.0, because of the aging of the 
population. At the other extreme the Haitian and Bolivian rates, 
the highest in the region, would decline from 19.7 to 13.7 and 
from 19.1 to 16.3 respectively. Other countries with present 
rates for above the regional average are Dominican Republic* 




as a whole, the rapid acceleration of population growth over the past 
few decades, Rising mortality rates are not to be expected anywhere unless 
catastrophes now unforeseeable intervene, except in Argentina. 
It is highly improbable that international immigration will ever 
regain the ability to play the important part in quantitative increase 
that i t did in a few Latin American countries in the past. Emiigration 
has present and potential importance only for a few of the small Caribbean 
countries. The future role of international migration will be mainly 
qualitative, and will depend on the balance between Latin American ability 
to attract migrants with needed skills and ability to limit the out-migration 
of nationals possessing such skills« Unfortunately, the latter current 
seems likely to predominate. Migration may .also be of some importance in 
.changing the balance of population between certain countries within the 
region, and the programs of economic integration may facilitate population 
movements between Latin American countries. Even this is questionable, in 
view of the growing dimensions of structural imemploywnt in almost a l l 
the countries and the resistances that migrations of this kind encounter 
once they reach a scale large enough to alter significantly the demographic 
traits of the host country. 
Attention thus centres on the future behaviour of f er t i l i ty , as not 
only the variable most likely to undergo major change but also the most 
susceptible to influence by public policies intended to control the rate 
of population increase. A high proportion of recent demographic research 
and writing has been devoted to this v a r i a b l e ^ The extremely youthful 
age composition resulting from the combination of high fert i l i ty and 
declining mortality in recent years gives an enormous momentum to further 
population increase, ensuring that crude birth rates will remain high and 
%J More than 40 of the papers submitted to the Latin American Regional 
Population Conference dealt with fer t i l i ty . See, in particular, the 
conference paper by Walter Mertens, "Fertility and Family Planning 




that the over-all rate of increase might not be affected for some years 
after the beginning of a decline in fert i l i ty rates for women of 
child bearing age. According to historical precedents, changes in the 
reproductive behaviour of women have been slow and gradual, with a few 
recent exceptions (Japan, Taiwan). Projections of variations in population 
growth rates using different assumptions concerning fert i l i ty trends thus 
point to the probability of a relatively narrow range of alternatives. 
According to the low variant- used in recent projections made by ECLA and 
CELADE, the population growth rate for Latin America as a whole might"drop 
from 2.83 per cent in 1960-1965 to 2*69 per cent in 1980-1985« According 
to an intermediate set of assumptions i t would rise slightly to 2.91 per 
cent, and according a high variant the rate might rise to 3*19 per cent., 
This would mean total regional populations in 1985 of All millions, 
425 millions, and 440 millions, respectively, compared to 238 millions in 
1 9 6 5 . ^ / 
Demographic projections are necessarily based on pant trends and on 
the possibilities for modification of those trends demonstrated by past 
experience. Demographers are «/ell aw&re that such trends may not be a 
realiable guide to the future.«17 Advances in contraceptive techniques, 
6/ See Tables 9 -U "in Chapter IV of Saoial Change a;pd SocAel gr^alopmant 
Policy in Latin America, pp. c it . These toíais includetF^ 2U Latin"" 
American republics and 4 Caribbean countries. If a l l Caribbean 
countries and territories are included the totals rise by nearly 
8 millions for 1965 and 10 millions for 1985® 
2/ "El cálculo de poblaciones futuras por medio de proyecciones de 
tendencias pasadas dentro de marcos estrictamente demográficos tiene 
sus riesgos en cualquier época. Esto es partícula mente cierto en 
América Latina en el periodo que se analiza. El supuesto de conti-
nuidad en las tasas de crecimiento debe llegar a ser, tarde o 
temprano un supuesto contrario a los h e c h o s ( I r e n e S.JTaeuber, 
"Tendencias demográficas futuras en América Latina). "/The predictions 
of demographers^J* have al l been dependent upon one premise; 'If 
present trends continue...1 It is an ancient statistical fallacy to 
perform extrapolations on this premise when in fact the premise is 
invalid. It i s my major point that recent trends have not continueds 
nor are they likely to do so. . . . /recent/ developments are so new 




the spread of public and private family planning services, the increasing 
pervasiveness of the mass communication media, and the drastic changes in 
social patterns, livelihood, physical environment and consumption stimuli 
to which most of the Latin American people are now exposed gight, in some 
combination as yet undefinable, bring about unprecedentedly rapid change 
in reproductive behaviour, and thus in population growth and age 
distribution. As in the case of mortality in the recent past, technological 
change and organized public action might make fert i l i ty changes muela less 
dependent on the economic and social gains that seem to have been their 
previous requisites« 
It i s well-known that two countries of the region, Argentina and 
Uruguay, have not shared in the regional pattern, of high fert i l i ty and 
accelerated population increase. In recent decades their demographic 
patterns have been closer to those of 2urope than to those of the remainder 
of Latin America. Two other countries, Chile and Cuba, are well along the 
way to moderate fert i l i ty and moderate rate of increase. The Chilean birth-
rate f e l l from 37.1 per thousand inhabitants in 1963 to 27*3 in 1969. More 
recently, a few small countries have moved in the same direction. The 
Costa iücan birth rate, nearly stable at a very high level up to 1963* f e l l 
from 45.3 in that year to 34.5 in 1969. Panama shows a smaller drop from 
41.0 in 1960 to 38.0 in 1969. The English-speaking countries of the 
Caribbean all show significant downward trends during the 1960s. 
2/ (continued) in predicting; what will happen in the future." (Donald 
Bogue, "The End of the Population Explosion", (Trinidad and Tobago, 
Central Statistical Office, Research Papers, No. 4, December 1967.) 
Nathan Keyfitz, making a distinction between simple projections and 
projections that aspire to serve as predictions, has remarked on the 
wide discrepancies between past predictions and what has happened, 
and on the paucity of evaluation studies: " . . . miles de páginas 
impresas dan cifras futuras, unos cuantos cientos de páginas establecen 
los supuestos sobre los qué se basan dichas cifras, unas cuantas 
docenas cuando mucho evalúan los métodos madiante la comparación de 
proyecciones pasadas con el desarrollo subsecuente." ("PLa proyección 





In Brazil, rational vital statistics are too incomplete to indicate 
whether the oversell rate (esii&aivad to "be around 3B) has ofeajsgod 
significantly, but in the city of Sao Paulo, after remaining-nearly stable 
for several years, the birth rate f e l l from 31.9 in 1963 to 25.1 in 
1968,^/ In a few other countries with complete birth statistics (according 
to the 1969 Demographic Yearbook),the birth rate also shows a declining trend* 
In SI Salvador the rate remained around 49 u? to 1963, then fe l l to 42 by 1969. 
In Guatemala, a similar decline from a rate around 49 began two years 
earlier. In these latter cases, however, the decline may be due^ at least 
in large part,-to changes in levels of mortality and in age structures 
and the extent to which there has been a real decline in fert i l i ty deriving 
from changes in the reproductive behaviour of the population is unknown. 
Verification would require observation of the evolution of other indices 
that cannot be calculated through the information available for these 
countries. In Chile, Costa Rica and Panama, however, declines in the 
gross reproduction rate (relation between members of the female births 
in two successive generations, assuming that the females survive up to 
the end of their reproductive period) confirm the trends indicated 
by the birth rates. 
It i s interesting that in various countries a decline in the birth 
rate begins sharply around 1963, following a period of stability. This 
trend can be observed both in countries in which fert i l i ty had previously 
fallen to a moderate level, and in countries with stable high birth rates 
in which no previous declines had been observed. Programmes for diffusion 
of contraceptive practices were too incipient in the early 1960s to have 
had any significant influence on fert i l i ty . Neither does the rapidity 
of the decline correspond to the historical experience of slow diffusion 
of birth control practices in different social classes. A plausible 
hypothesis would be that during this period large numbers of persons 
already trying or wanting to control their fert i l i ty gained access through 
their own initiative to more efficient methods of doing so. 
8/ Olavo Baptista Filho, "Extensión del periodo de formación profesional 




Preliminary data from six 1970 censuses suggest that in the few 
countries in which the demographic transition to lower fert i l i ty began 
some time ago i t has proceeded more rapidly than expected, but that 
elsewhere decreases in fert i l i ty , i f present, are not yet sufficient to 
do more than offset declining mortality® (It deserves emphasis that the 
preliminary totals frequently suggest erroneous conclusions when allowance 
is not made for under-enumeration.) Three countries show discrepancies 
on the low side between census population and projected population that 
are too large to be accounted for by under-cnumetarion. In Argentina, the 
projected population is 4*8 per cent higher than the census population 
(24-444c000 against 23*323.000). If one allows for some under-enumeration 
(probably less than 3 per cent), the population has been increasing a 
l i t t l e more slowly than expected* In Chile, the discrepancy is 10.2 per 
cent (9*735*000 against 8*835.000) eo that the. real.-slackening in population 
growth must be quite significant. In the Dominican Republic* the 
discrepancy is 6.6 percent (4o277«000 against 4.012.000). In this case, 
the discrepancy is harder to explain. Mortality may have remainded at a 
higher level than expected or under-enumeration may have been extensive. 
No significant drop in fert i l i ty has been detected nor expected, in view of the 
characteristics of the country. In Panama the projected population was about 
2 per cent below the census population (1.399.000 to 1.425.000), a discrepancy 
that might easily be doubled once under-enumeration is allowed for , although 
fert i l i ty declined more substantially during the decade than the projection 
assumed, so that a discrepancy on the high side might be expected. A positive 
balance in international migration or a more rapid do aline in mortality than 
was assumed in the projection may have offset deolining fer t i l i ty , but present 
information does not permit verification of these hypotheses. In Mexico* 
a discrepancy of 3.4 per cent might be accounted for mainly by under-
enumeration. Thus, the Mexican rate of population increase has not 
slackened significantly. In the particularly interesting case of Brazil, 
preliminary census figures indicate a population of 92.300.000, differing 
only 1.5 per cent from the projection for the census date (93.687.000); 
the percentage of under-enumeration in Brazil may be relatively important, 




Whether this is owing to the maintenance of fert i l i ty at higher 
levels than expected or a more pronounced decline in mortality than 
expected, or both, cannot be determined until the ful l census results 
are available« 
Elsewhsre demographers are watching anxiously for signs of change 
in reproductive behaviour and speculating on the influences at work. Even 
the highest fert i l i ty rates in Latin America are well below the biological 
maximum, and increases would be theoretically possible, although not all 
likely* Some degree of control over fert i l i ty is exercised, through some 
combination of actions influenced by social and cultural patterns, whether 
9/ 
or not these actions are deliberately directed toward fert i l i ty control«*6' 
Even though the fert i l i ty rates for women of reproductive age continue at high 
levels in most of the countries,, the over-all rates can conceal shifts 
that will be important for the future» In Mexico, for example, women in 
the youngest reproductive age group (15-24) show fert i l i ty rates 
significantly lower than did women in the same age group a few years ago, 
%f A widely used classification distinguishes eleven "intermediate 
variables" as the only factors through which cultural conditions 
can affect fert i l i ty ; 
1« Factors Affecting Exposure to Intercourse (Intercourse Variables) 
A» Those governing the formation and dissolution of unions in 
the reproductive period* 
1. Age of entry into sexual unions. 
2. Perraament celibacy; proportion of women never entering 
sexual unions. 
3 . Amount of reproductive period spent after or between 
unions. 
6 . Those governing the exposure to intercourse within unions. 
4. Voluntary abstinence. 
5» Involuntary abstinence. 
6. Coital frequency. 
II. Factors affecting Exposure to Conception ("Conception Variables") 
7. Fecundity or infecundity, as affected by involuntary causes. 
8. Use or non-use of contraception. 
9. Fecundity or infecundity, as affected by voluntary causes. 
I II . Factors Affecting Gestation and Successful Parturition (."Gestation 
Variables".) 
10. Foetal mortality from involuntary causes. 
11. Foetal mortality from voluntary causes. 
(Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake, "Social Structure and Fertility; ' 
An Analytical Framework".-Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
IV, 3, April 1956; Spanish version in Kingsley Davis, La Sociedad 




resulting frcm some combination of later marriage, wider use of contraception, 
and abortions. In the over-all rate, :his decrease is offset by higher 
fer t i l i ty among women 30-39 years of agí:» probably resulting from better' 
health in this group ató diminished mortality of rale partners. I f the 
newer reproductive pattern among the younger women persists and means that 
they ar-3 going to choose fewer children for the whole of their reproductive 
1 0 1 
span, the overa l l rate wil l eventually begin to drop**-*' Fertility 
differentials according to levels of income and education and degree of 
urbanization have been demonstrated for almost all the Latin American 
countries. It is reasonable to suppose that i f urbanization continues 
and levels of education and income rise - and particularly i f incomes 
and access to education are more evenly distributed - overfall fert i l i ty 
rates will decline. 
On the basis of such evidence, inconclusive as i t i s , demographers 
are inclined to expect the beginning during the 1970s of prcssouticed 
declines in fert i l i ty in the more economically and socially dynamic countries 
of the region. How fast and how important this decline may be "remains a 
P / 
matter of speculation at this moment". 
Later sections of the present survey will enter further into the 
evidence bearing on these speculations, although the discussion will 
perforce be inconclusive. For the present, two generalizations can be 
made with confidence. 
First, whatever the changes in fer t i l i ty , population growth rates 
will regain for nieny ye¿rs at high enough levels to bring about enoxmous 
increments to the population. As the population base expands, even rates 
of increase much lower than the present will, produce very large absolute 
increments. It would be impossible to derive from existing evidence any 
plausible prediction as to when and whether Latin America will attain a -
10/ Centro de Estudios Económicos y Demográficos, El Colegio de México, 
Dinámica de la Población de México (Mexico, D.F., 1970), pp. 60-61, 
33* 187. 




stationary population, but such an event could hardly come about before 
the year 2050 and before the regional population has reached several 
times its present size3^^ 
Second, decreases in fer t i l i ty and in family size are bound to be very 
unevenly distributed, and probably with a continuing inverse relationship 
to capacity to bear the burdens and take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by increase in the number of children. The decline of fert i l i ty 
will proceed in the mere urbanized and more dynamic countries, and in 
countries able to support relatively high levels of education and social 
services, before i t begins in the smaller and poorer countries, which 
already have the highest fert i l i ty rates of the region«, Within countries, 
fert i l i ty will decline in the wealthier, more "modern", more urbanized 
localities before i t does in the poorer and mors rural internal regions,, 
As to social classes and income groups, i t is wall-known that the middle 
and upper strata already practice family limitation more consistently and 
effectively than do the lower strata particularly the urban marginal 
population and the rural masses. This differential will probably continue, 
whatever the speed and effectiveness of the diffusion of fert i l i ty 
limitation practices among the latter g r o u p s I f so, continuing 
population increase may be an important factor in accentuating the multiple 
imbalances and distributional inequities that now characterize Latin 
American economic growth and social changes* 
(b) Geographic distribution, urbanization and internal migration 
It is well-known that rapid population increase in most Latin American 
countries has been accompanied by increasing unovenness in the geographical 
distribution of population and by peculiarly rapid and concentrated 
urbanization. Within the past two decades there have been certain important 
advances in the frontiers of land settlement and a number of new urban 
12/ It has been calculated that the population of a country will continue 
to grow for 65 to 70 years after a unitary rate of reproduction (two 
children per couple surviving their parents) has been reached. If 
Latin America were to reach a unitary rate in 1980-1985* the population 
would become stationary 552.4 millions in 2045. A. unitary rate in 
1990-1995 would mean a population of 654.8 millions in 2050, and a 
unitary rate in 2000-2005 would mean a population of 783»2 millions in 
2070. (Projections by U*S. Bureau of thé Census, May 1970.) A unitary 
rate before 2000 seems highly unlikely* 
13/ In Chile, crude birth rates f e l l between 15 and 23 per cent in the most 
urbanized provinces between 1961 and 1967; in predominantly rural 
provinces the drop was much smaller. * While the rate of legitimate births 
f e l l , the rate of illegitimate births (accounted for mainly by the 




growth poles in previously empty regions can be identified. Nevertheless, 
most of the regions previously empty or thinly populated have remained so; 
in most of the longer-settled predominantly rural regions, net population 
growth has been moderate, and some have become stationary or lost 
population. In fact , the areas that have lo:->t population includo various 
thinly populated zones of relatively recent frontier settlement, such as 
the Argentine Chaco. 
Since there is no reason to doubt that the rate of natural increase 
in rtaral areas is as high,.*s that in urban areas i f not higher * i t i s 
obvious that rapid and concentrated urbanization must involve a very 
considerable transfer of rural people into areas defined as urban. While 
variations between countries are wide, i t can be roughly estimated that 
for the region as a whole, half of a natural rural population increase 
of 3 per cent per year has been moving out of the rural category and 
contributing directly from a third to a half of urban growth,. . This nexfly 
urban population, predominantly of young adults retaining typically high 
rural fert i l i ty rates also accounts 'for an important proportion of urban 
natural increase. 
In spite of a fair number of local investigations and a great deal of 
discussion it is not $uch easier now than in 1959 make sound 
generalizations about the causes, characteristics and consequences of this 
phenomenon. Part of the dif f iculty derives from the inadequacies of past 
census data and the fact that most of the data available derive from the 
1950 and I960 round of censuses, while the cities have grown enormously 
during the 1960s and the composition of their populations may have 
changed significantly. Part derives from the ambiguities of terminology. 
Neither the term "migrant" nor the terms "urban" and "rural" can be given 
satisfactory all-purpose definitions. This di f f iculty , in turn, derives 
from the complexity and diversity of the processes involved. There are 
14/ In 1959 a seminar co-sponsored by the United Nations, the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and Unesco brought together studies 
constituting the f irst broad inter-disciplinary survey of urbanization 
in the region. (Unesco, Urbanization in Latin America. 1961.) 
Seç also Geograhical Distribution of the Population of Latin America 
and Regional Development Priorities", Economic Bulletin for La,tin 




many kinds of urban as well as rural areas» The "urban" character of a modern 
metropolis with several millions of inhabitants is quite different from 
the urban character of a new and specialized centre of heavy industry, 
a traditional medium-sized provincial capital, or a small town providing 
marketing and administrative services to a limited rural hinterland. 
Zones of modern mechanized farming, plantations, traditional haciendas, 
compact village settlements, Indian comunities, and dispersed minifundio 
Cultivators are equally diverse, culturally and demographically as well 
as economically. The composition of migration to and from the different 
kinds of urban and rural cutting in a l l probability quite different. • 
Almost any assertion concerning urbanization and migration may be valid for 
some urban areas and some migrants. SubJeww to these cautions, the weight 
of recent evidence supports the folloxving conclusions:-^ 
(1) Migrants arriving in the large cities are an extremely 
heterogeneous group in respect to education* occupations, and social 
characteristics- They are predominantly from smaller cities and towns. 
The view s t i l l repeated in articles on urban problems that the migrants 
are mainly uprooted peasants and youth from peasant families is untenable, 
although such migrants may be of considerable importance in certain c i t ies . 
(It should also be kept in mind that, from the standpoint of the modern 
metropolis, the cultural traits of small-town migrants may appear "rural".) 
(2) Through a process of self-selection, the migrants have been 
predominantly young adults, better-educated and possessing higher levels 
of skills than the averages for populations of their places of origin, 
although below the averages for the native populations of the cit ies 
to which.they have migrated» The evidence does not support the view that 
the migrants have been "marginalized" in higher proportions than the 
15/ These conclusions are drawn mainly from two papers presented at the 
1970 Latin American Regional Population Conference: Juan C. Elizaga, 
"Migraciones Interiores: Evolución Reciente y Estado Actual de 
los Estudios"; John J. í&cisco Jr., "Some Thoughts on an Analytical 




native urban population. There is evidence, however, that as the scale 
of migration to some of the great cities has continued to increase i t 
16/ has become less selective and less preaonunatly urbane,—7 
(3) The investigations that have been made do not support the hypothesis 
that "stop-wise" migration has been important; that i s , that migrants have 
moved f i rst to the smaller local urban centres, then to the great c i t ies . 
The gap between rural natural and net rates of population increase, however, 
demonstrates that large numbers of rural- people are somehow becoming 
"urban1** Part of this would be due to the growth of small centres above 
the dividing line of 2,000 used to distinguish rural from urban, but a 
part must also be due to a replacement in the small towns and, provincial 
n ry / 
^cities of the out-migrants by rural in-migrantSc™' 
(4) In some of the larger countries there are indications that the 
concentration of urban growth in the largest centres is beginning to be 
reversed. Some second-rank cities are growing faster than the main 
agglomerations, and there are significant increases in the numbers and 
16/ See Alan B. Simmons and Ramiro Cardona G., "La selectividad de la 
migración en una perspectiva histórica: El caso de Bogotá (Colombia) 
1929-1968»; Jorge Balan and Elizabeth Jelin, "Migración a la Ciudad 
y Movilidad Social: Un Caso Mexicano"; and Jorge Balán* "Migrant 
Native Socio-Economic Differences in Latin American Cities 2 A 
Structural Analysis" (with commentaries by various sociologists) 
Latin American Research Review, IV., 1, 1969o The hypothesis has also 
been advanced, on the basis of studies in Rio de Janeiro and Santiago, 
that migration to the great cities is selective of both extremes of the 
socio-economic continuum. (Bruce H. Herrick, Urban Migration and Economic 
Development in Chile. MIT Press, 1965.) 
12/ In Colombia, "a f i l l - i n migration pattern (in which rural migrants 
move to villages and small towns, and from which other residents 
move on to larger towns and cit ies) seems to f i t the considerable amount 
of admittedly fragmentary evidence better than a stage or step migration 
process . . . The significance of this f i l l - i n process, i f substantiated 
by further studies, i s very great. It would mean that the smaller towns 
are passing through a deeper crisis than is usually assumed. The large 
towns, after a l l , are receiving the more dynamic and younger migrants; 
the small towns lose some of their best people who are replaced by 
peasants without skills and without capital". (Towards Full Employment. 
A Programme for Colombia prepared by an Inter-Agency Team organized by 





quantitative importance of small towns.—J However, the predominance of the 
main agglomeration is commonly so great that the limited changes observed 
may not lead to a significant disminution in this pi*edominance. In Colombia, 
on the other hand, the increasing predominance of Bogota has transformed 
a process of urban growth previously much more balanced than in the other 
countries0 At the same time, in some of the larger contries the relative 
importance of the urban population, and within this population the 
importance of the largest centres, has grown to a point at-/which "the store 
of migration in further city growth is bound to decline and the inter-
urban character of such migration is bound to be accentuated. 
These tentative conclusions are bassd on mainly field investigations 
in a limited number of cit ies and for different periods during the 1950s 
and 1960s the possibility cannot be ruled out that predominant trends 
elsewhere are different, in respect to the importance or rural migrants 
and the differential marginalisation of migrants, or that predominant 
trends have changed since the date of ,the investigation, Thej also do 
not throw sufficient light on the future. While the rate of growth 
of population is relatively inflexible in the short term, the currents 
of geographical redistribution of such population might change considerably 
within a few years. The great urban agglomeration may well be increasingly 
strangled by inability to of fer minimun infrastructure1 services and 
amenities, while the benefits now sought from residence in such 
agglomerations will certainly be more evenly diffused by innovations 
in mass communications and transport. 
The most important factor.may well be the ability of different kinds 
of locality to offer employment, or at least a marginal livelihood, under 
the conditions of worsening maladjustment between supply and demand for 
labour that can be foreseen. The receptiveness of the population, rural 
as well as urban, to any incentives to migrate will probably continue 
to increase. National policies and measures concerning industrial location, 
18/ Dinámica de la. Población de México, op. c i t . , pp. 124-125, 132; 
also John V.Grauman and Chia-Lin Pan, "Rasgos distintivos de la 
Urbanización en América Latina". Conclusions concerning the 




highway and other public works construction, agrarian reform, and distribution 
of social services and social assistance can influence decisively the 
scope and directions of such migration* The diff iculty i s , that the 
stimuli provided by public programmes are likely to provoko migratory 
flows larger than can be absorbed productively« 
It has been suggested that a slowing down of urbanization might mean 
postponement of the expected declines in national birth rates, in view of 
the weaker rural motivations and means for fert i l i ty control. This 
factorj however, may well be offset by the accelerating penetration of 
urban cultural trait and aspirations in the countryside, 
(c) . Life 3 age and sex, distribution 
The average life-span in Latin America ao a whole has increased 
markedly during recent years, and this increase is expected to continue. 
For the region as a whole, th^ expectancy of l i f e at birth is e jected to 
rise from 60.2 years in 1965-1970 to 66.7 years in 1980-1935. The latter 
l i f e expectancy is 9 years greater than that projected for Asia as a 
whole, and only 6 years less than that projected for the high-income 
countries taken together. The past increases have been very unevenly 
distributed; the snailer and poorer countries are expected to gain more 
rapidly than the rest during the coming years, but will s t i l l lag behind in 
1930-1985« The same forecast can be made for the poorer and mere rural 
internal regions of each country. For example, the l i f e expectancies 
projected for Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador range between 
56.8 and 63.9 years, with Bolivia and Haiti at 50.0 and 53.5 respectively, 
while Brazil is expected to reach 67.6, Colombia 65*5* Mexico 68.6, 
Peru 67.0, and Venezuela 7 0 . 2 . ^ 
The high rates of fert i l i ty and of population increase, however, mean 
that even changes of these dimensions in l i f e expectancies will have 
l i t t l e effect on the age distribution of the population and the notoriously 
high ratios of population in the ages conventionally defined as those of 
dependancy to the population in the "active" age groups. The percentage of 
population in the 0-14 age group would decline only slightly, according 
19/ See Chapter IV in Social Change and Social .-Development, Policy in 
Latin America* 
/ t o median 
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to median Variant projections, from 42.5 per cent in 1965 to 41*4 per 
cent in 1985* The potentially active age group 15-64 would rise 
slightly, from 53.8 per cent to 54.4. per cent. The age group 65 and 
over, in spite of a very rapid increase in numbers resulting from 
greater average longevity, would increase only from 3.6 per cent to 
4*0 per cent of the total , ihe averages, of course, conceal very 
significant differences between countries. In Argentina, Chile, Cuba, 
and Uruguay, the youthful population, already far below the regional 
average^ will decline more sharply, and the aged population, already above 
the regional average, will rise considerably, In Chile and Cuba, the 
percentages in the middle "active" age group will rise significantly i f 
the decline in fer t i l i ty continues. In Argentina and Uruguay, where there 
is l i t t l e room for further decrease in fer t i l i ty , the cohorts born in 
past periods of higher fer t i l i ty are reaching retirement age, and the 
percentages in the "active" age group will decline in relation to the 
two dependent groups combined*^/ In a few of the smaller countries 
the percentage in the 0-14 group will continue to rise. 
It follows that the very high ratios of dependent population (under 
15 and 65 and over) to potentially active population will not change very 
much over the next 15 years except in therfour countries named above. 
According to one projection, the ratio for the region as a whole would 
decline from 86-100 in 1970 to 84-100 in 1985, compared to ratios of 57 
and 58 for the "developed" regions of trie world and 81 and 77 for the 
"developing" regions as a whole.21/ sinCe dependency ratios in the four 
\ 
countries named above are only slightly higher than the average for the 
"developed" regions, ratios in most other Latin American countries are 
well above the regional average, in a few instances the development 
population being practically as large as the population in the active age 
span. Various implications of these dependancy ratios will be discussed 
in later sections. 
20/ This trend is also owing in part to the fact that the cohorts affected 
by the large-scale immigration of working-age adults in the past are 
n«w reaching retirement age. 
21/ The dependency ratio thus defined i s , of course, much smaller than 
the real dependency ratio mainly because of the limited participation 
of women in the active population. 
• /Within the 
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Within the Latin American countries both the age distribution and 
the sex distribution of the population are being affected significantly 
by the currents of geographical redistribution and urbanization. In 
view of the inadequacies of information on migration these phenomena can be 
mentioned only in very general terms. It is clear that young adults are 
over-represented in the populations of the cities that receive such 
migration and under-represented in the rural zones and small towns that 
are sources of migrants. Women are over-represented in migrations to the' 
cit ies and in migrations over short distances. Men are over-represented 
in migration to zones of land settlement and in migrations over long 
distances. These differentials might be expected to have important 
repercussions on the relative dynamism of the labour force and in capacities 
for innovation in the zones of out-migration and in-migration. The 
differential migration of women should have repercussions on the formation 
of fe-milies. .. These topics have been the subject of speculation for some 
years, but relevant information continues to be scanty, 
(d) Typgs of countries 
The above summary suggests that the latin American, countries fa l l into 
several distinct groups in regard to their population structures. These 
groups coincide in the main with types that can be distinguished on the 
basis of other social and economic characteristics. For present purposes 
i t is unnecessary to enter into a systematic discussion of the typologies 
that have been proposed.^/ So as to guard against over-generalization, 
however, it may be useful to indicate roughly the distribution of the Latin 
American population among groups with differing demographic situations and 
differing combinations of factors influencing future evolution. These 
differing situations suggest the desirability of corresponding differences, 
at least in emphasis, in national population policies: 
a ) About 10 per cent of the population of the region lives in two 
countries (Argentina and Uruguay) in which fert i l i ty and mortality have 
fallen to levels similar to those of the highly urbanized and industrialized 
countries of other regions. 
22/ See Chapters III and XVIII in Social Change and Social Development 
Policy in Latin America. See also Carmen A. Miró, Aspectos Demográficos 
de América Latina. CELADE, Document k/88. 
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(2) About 7 per cent lives in two countries (Chile and Cuba) in which 
the transition to a similar demographic pattern seems to be well under way, 
(3) fcbre than 67 per cent lives in five large countries (Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) with high'rates of population increase 
up to the present, with rapid urbanization and considerable economic growth, 
but with great and probably widening inequalities between internal regions, 
urban and rural zones, and economic sectors. 
(4) About one per cent lives in two small countries (Costa Rica and. 
Panama) with very high rates of increase up to the present, but with 
recent indications of the beginning of a transition, and with urbanization, 
income levels and educational levels 'above the regional average. 
5) About 9 per cent lives in seven small countries with no more than 
6 million inhabitants in 1970 (Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic) with very high rates of 
population increase, with urbanization, income levels and educational levels 
lower than in any of the preceding groups, although with rates of growth 
in these factors falling in the same range as the countries in group 3» 
(6) About 3 per cent lives in two countries (Bolivia and Haiti) in 
which the highest mortality rates of the region limit population increase 
to moderate rates in spite of high fert i l i ty . In these countries levels 
of urbanization, incomes and education are even lower than in group 5, and 
rates of increase in these factors also tend to be low. 
(7) About 3 per cent lives in four independent countries and nearly 
twenty other separate territorial units in the Caribbean areas; most of these 
small and densely populated countries and territories have rates of fer t i l i ty 
and of population increase that have fallen significantly from previously 
high levels; in a good many of them emigration outside the region has helped 
to lower rates of population increase and has affected age distribution. 
y The justifications, practicability and objectives of public programmes 
designed to influence the demographic variables, and particularly the urgency 
of public support of such programmes, should vary considerably in the 
different groups of countries and even between countries within the groups. 
Hie case for action to. reduce fert i l i ty rates, for example, should be strongest 
in group 5* while the need for exertion of influence on geographical 
distribution of population would be strongest in group 3. 
s / 3 . Inter-relations 
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3• Inter-relations between demographic change» social and 
econcmic change, and public policies 
It can be assumed that the demographic changes summarized above 
influence and are in turn influenced by the whole range of social and 
economic change processes going on in Latin America, as well as the public 
policies that aspire to channel these changes toward development and enhanced 
human welfare» It can also be assumed that, while these influences can be 
separated for analytical purposes, they do not operate unilaterally and 
in isolation. The meaning of each factor depends on its insertion into 
a specific social and economic structure and its impingement on specific 
social classes and types of family within this structure. In a well-known 
folk tale a simple peasant giving shelter to a stranger on a cold night 
became suspicious of magic when the stranger blew on his hands to warn them 
arid then blew on his soup to cool i t . It would be just as ingenuous to be 
surprised i f prosperity or poverty can prcmote rapid population growth and. 
urban concentration under some circumstances and discourage these trends 
under others, or i f these demographic trends can promote economic growth 
under some circumstances and frustrate i t under others. 
Most of the generalizations on the inter-relations between demographic 
change and other cultural, social and economic variables have been based 
on investigations focussed on the past of the high-income industrialized 
countries, or on incomplete models, or on suppositions that are of doubtful 
relevance to the real situations of Latin America. These generalizations 
have been subjected to searching criticisms, particularly in several of 
the documents presented to the Latin American Regional Population Conference, 
but empirical info mat ion is s t i l l insufficient and, an integral conceptual 
interpretation explaining the inter-relationships within the whole range 
of essential variables is lacking. The present aection will thus perforce 
be limited to a very preliminary confrontation of these generalizations 
with a diagnosis of Latin American realities that has been set forth in 
previous ECLA studies, 
(a) Social stratification and families 
Demographic investigations and analyses, including a few relating to 
Latin America, have demonstrated fairly consistent relationships between 
social stratification and fert i l i ty . Fertility reaches its highest level 
/ in the 
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in the lower or poorer strata, declines in the middle strata, rises again 
slightly in the higher or wealthier strata» Roughly similar inverse 
relationships have been found between fert i l i ty and occupational levels 
(frequently used as the main indicator for social stratification), income 
levels, educational levels, residential pattern (large city, town, rural)* 
The influence of social stratification on fert i l i ty is exerted through 
the family, by shaping values and decisions, f irst cn family formation, 
then on the number and spacing of children, then by helping to determine 
the family fs capacity to act on such decisions and the means by which i t 
chooses to do so. The strength of family motivations is more important 
than ready availability of means. It has been pointed out that in 
19th Century Western Europe low fert i l i ty was attained through family 
decision, in spite of public disapproval and means of control that were 
inconvenient and dif f icult of access. In many countries today, fert i l i ty 
continues high in spite of relatively convenient contraceptive techniques 
and strong public support for their use. 
It can be assumed that families of the urban upper and middle strata 
throughout Latin America have relatively well-defined objectives as to 
numbers of children aM have access to effective means of accomplishing 
these objectives. The fact that the middle strata choose to have relatively 
few children can plausibly be attributed to the increasing strain exerted 
by larger numbers of children on their capacity to maintain the standard 
of living associated with their rather precarious middle status and on 
their capacity to educate the children to a level enabling them to maintain 
or improve this status in the next generation. The higher fert i l i ty of 
the upper strata can be attributed to their greater security and capacity 
to support a large family at their accepted standard. In both strata, 
restrictions of fert i l i ty seem to be quite recent and associated with the 
rapid "modernization" of these strata under the cultural influence of the 
high-income world centres. Until, recently, in fact, numbers of children 
among the upper strata were so high that they were often accused of 
monopolizing the middle occupational roles to provide for them, thus 
inhibiting upward mobility. Rising income levels and greater security 




greater insecurity and the disadvantages of division of property among toò 
many heirs might induce the upper strata to have fewer. In any case, i t 
can be expected that the aggregate decisions of the families of these strata 
will produce moderate rates of population increase, with some fluctuations 
deriving from the edoncmic and political state of the countries, and that 
in the countries in which economic growth and urbanization proceed with 
at least moderate speed, the proportion of families adopting and acting 
on decisions contributing to moderate fert i l i ty will increase. 
The really urgent question concern the families, a majority in. most 
countries of the region, belonging to the rural and urban lower strata 
that in practically a l l societies have had thè highest fert i l i ty rates, 
now no longer offset by high mortality. There i s an abundant literature 
of explanations for the high fert i l i ty of the poor: the past need to have 
many children to insure that some would survive; the economic value of 
children in traditional agricultural and artisanal activities; the 
culturally-determined desire to beget many children as a proof of 
masculinity ("machismo"); the role of descendants as the only sources of 
social security for the aged; the inability of the marginalized lower-
strata to exert any foresight, or their lack of confidence that any 
restraint they might exercise in procreation would lead to improvement in 
their l o t . 
The lower strata undoubtedly comprise many types of families 
undergoing different kinds of change, but the sociology of the family in 
Latin America has received too l i t t l e serious attention for i t to be possible 
to construct a typology of families permitting assessment of the relative 
importance of these explanations. It can be assumed that the differences 
between urban and rural families of the lower strata are very wide in 
regard to motivations and i t i s probable that the differences can be nearly 
as wide between families in different rural settings or urban settings. 
At present, under the conditions of social and economic change with 
many contradictions and discontinuities characteristic of Latin America, 
most families of the lower strata are ecxposed to conflicting values and 




influence behaviour after they have lost their relevance to the situation 
of the family and combine with reactions of apathy and passivity in the 
face of di f f icult ies and sources of insecurity beyond the capacity of the 
family to resolve. The families in question are al l (except possibly in 
some of the remotest and poorest internal regions, where high fert i l i ty 
i s s t i l l offset by high mortality) affected by the specific kinds of 
"modernization" Latin America i s now undergoing,^but they are affected in 
largely unprecedented ways that make inferences drawn from the reproductive 
behaviour of traditional societies or of the poorer classes in high-income 
industrialized societies of doubtful validity as guides to the future. 
The consequences of present trends for the low-income families can be 
summed up as follows: 
(1) Increasingly pervasive exposure to modern mass communication 
media that do not require literacy: television in the cit ies, 
transistor radios\ almost everywhere. 
(2) Exposure to educational, health, and other public social services 
that are very unevenly distributed and generally of poor quality 
but that are much more widely accessible and more actively sought 
than was the case in societies at equivalent income levels in 
the past. 
(3) Access to mass transport, particularly buses, making movements 
. between rural areas, towns, and cities unprecedentedly cheap 
and easy. 
(4) Exposure to modern consumption stimuli, frustrated in large part 
by low incomes and the bias of domestic industry toward production 
for the upper-income market. 
(5) Opportunities for employment in modern mechanized and rationalized 
enterprises widely known but accessible only to a small minority; 
for the majority "modernization" in this area takes the fom of 
"marginalization": livelihood in the previous agricultural and 
artisanal occupations becomes more insecure and more unattractive 
in terms of relative i f not absolute income levels, while part 
of the labour force previously in these occupations i s displaced 




Up to the present, the dif f iculties and forms of insecurity to 
which the urbanizing lower strata are exposed, have had no measurable 
impact on their reproductive behaviour; according to the fragmentary 
data, fert i l i ty rates in the urban marginal settlements seem to be as high 
as in the rural areas» It has been plausibly inferred that, while middle-
class insecurity motivates low fert i l i ty , lower-class insecurity produces 
passive acceptance of high fert i l i ty , countered only-by expedients that 
require least foresight, particularly abortion. 
This does not necessarily mean that lower-class insecurity may not 
have different consequences in the future, as new and more convenient 
contraceptives become available and as "modern" urban values and 
consumption aspirations are internalized. There may be some temptation 
to underestimate the capacity for foresight and decision-making among 
the strata in question, and to over-estimate the time-span, needed for 
effective changes in attitudes toward fert i l i ty , often placed at a ful l 
generation. The weight of evidence, scanty as i t is , suggests that 
decisions on migration are, in general, taken rationally, and in realistic 
appreciation of the range of alternatives for livelihood, none of them 
very inviting. Whether the fert i l i ty patterns of the urban and rural 
lower strata will change to an important extent as long as the trends 
toward marginalization continue is one of the many danographic questions 
that cannot now be answered with any confidence.1^^ 
In view of the probable wide differences between family structures 
and trends in different settings, i t is unsafe to generalize either 
concerning the influence of family characteristics on fert i l i ty or 
concerning the influence of possible fert i l i ty changes on the family* 
If the woman is more motivated and takes the leading role in fert i l i ty 
limitation, as seems likely from the investigations, lower fert i l i ty would 
2ß/ A 1969 study of fer t i l i ty behaviour of lower class women in Rio de 
Janeiro indicated a very marked increase in knowledge and use of 
the more recent contraceptive techniques since the CELADE inquiry 
in 1963, although poverty and inadequate information hindered the 
effective use of these techniques. (George Martins, Fertility 




be at once a consequence of a stimulus toward a more independent role . 
for wan en in the family and the society. At the same time, female-centred 
families, in which the woman assumes main responsibility for up-bringing 
of children fathered by a series of male partners, have long been 
characteristic of the lower strata in some Latin American settings, 
although uncomnon and deviant in others. Such patterns might be promoted 
by the combination of fert i l i ty control exercised by the woman and male 
inability to function dependably as breadwinner. 
It would also be naive to ignore that a great deal of sexual 
activity, capable of contributing appreciably to the birth rate in the 
absence of generalised resort to contraception or abortion, i s divorced 
from any family structure, even the female-centered family. In many 
urban settings in which previous family patterns and controls are subject 
to strain and disruption this phenomenon, or at least the social evils 
deriving frcm i t , seem to be gaining in importance. Young girls made 
pregnant in casual or experimental sexual encounters either resort to abortion 
or abandon their children. Investigations are needed to distinguish 
the real extent of this phenomenon from the alannist generalisations 
sometimes made about i t , and to test the hypothesis that i t is se l f -
perpetuating, as increasing numbers of children lacking any stable family 
up-bringing reach puberty.^/ To the extent that reproductive behaviour 
of this kind exists, the emphasis in most declarations concerning population 
policy on the right of the family to determine the number and spacing of 
children becomes irrelevant, and the problem centres on the right of the 
youth to have sexual relations without unwanted consequences, or the right 
of society to take measures combatting reproduction under such completely 
unpropitious circumstances, 
(b) Social services 
In relation to all of the public social services and the associated 
components of the level of living two main questions present themselves: 
( i ) What are the influences of population growth and redistribution on the 
24/ In Venezuela, the Consejo Venezolano del Niño has estimated the number 
of abandoned children at 350,000. (La Mujer Venezolana y la Regulación 





capacity of the State to provide such services and on the capacity of the 
families to make use of them? ( i i ) What are the influences of the services 
themselves, and of the gains in levels of living expected to derive from 
them, on population growth and redistribution? 
These questions cannot be answered by studies restricted to the 
demographic variables and the sectoral social services taken separately. 
The growth, distribution and content of the social services are influenced 
by the values and priorities dominant in a given society. Danographic 
trends intensify dif f icult ies or facil itate opportunities that would be 
present in any case. The redistributive role of social services in most 
of Latin America has been limited; differences in access to such services 
coincides for the most part with differences in income levels, occupational 
levels, and urban or rural residence.^' Within this over-all i t would be 
dif f icult to demonstrate whether the social services have a significant t 
role in the differences in demographic traits between social strata and 
local i t ies . 
As to the future influence of demographic change on the social 
services themselves, i t can be assumed that in al l social sectors'declining 
fert i l i ty would enhance the capacity of the State to raise the quality 
and coverage of services and the capacity of families to take advantage 
of them. It must be kept in mind, however, that the unsatisfied backlog 
of demand for services and needs for improvement in nutrition and housing 
are so great that i t would be unrealistic to expect demographic changes 
to bring about during the, short and medium tern, any alleviation of the 
pressures on the State to allocate resources to social action. On the 
contrary, to the extent that families become able to control their own 
fert i l i ty they will also become better able to articulate and enforce 
demands for public action to help them meet their other needs. In. the 
longer term, changes in age distribution will bring about important shifts 
in the relative importance of different social services and in the more 
specific activities in each sector. During the 1970s, however, this factor 
will be of minor importance except in the minority of countries mentioned 
above, in which the transition to new demographic patterns is well advanced. 
2£/ See Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* 
Part I I . 
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( i ) .Education. In most Latin American countries, the percentage of 
population in the age group 5-14, i s between 26 and 2 T h e size of the 
group is- increasing by about 3 per cent annually. If i t is assumed that the 
minimum objective for universal education calls for six years of schooling 
for each child, primary school enrolment should account for at least three-t 
f i f ths of the age group, or more than 15 per cent of the total population. 
The equivalent percentage for most of the high-income industrialized 
countries would be 9 or 10, and the annual rate of increase between one 
and two per cent* The magnitude of the burden, under these conditions, 
of staffing and financing adequate educational services is too obvious 
to require extensive demonstration. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the task has not prevented steady 
improvements in educational levels in most Latin American countries during 
recent decades. Enrolment at all educational levels has grown faster than 
population. Census data for around I960 indicates higher literacy rates 
and more prolonged school attendance for the younger , age groups than for 
the older, and there i s no reason to doubt that the 1970 censuses will 
show similar trends. Education in Latin America is undergoing a complex . 
crisis , in which costs have an important role, but i t cannot be 
demonstrated that the large size and rapid growth of school age groups 
makes the cost of attending to their minimum formal educational needs 
prohibitive. Moreover, many educators are now convinced that, through 
intelligent use of technological innovations and the elimination of 
irrelevant subject-matters and out-dated teaching routines, the basic 
tasks of the schools could be accomplished in less time and expense per 
pupil. 
26/ The exceptions are Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Cuba, and the English-
speaking Caribbean countries, where the corresponding age group i s 
smaller in varying degrees. The age group is one conventionally 
used by demographers. The age group 7-16, which would correspond 




In spite of the apparently favourable quantitative trends, the 
distribution of education remains qualitatively as well as quantitatively 
inverse to the social level of the different population groups» This 
differential derives partly from the capacity of the better-off strata 
to influence the distribution of educational resources, but i t also derives 
from the disadvantages of the poorer strata in making use of whatever 
27/ 
educational services are offered* This problem cannot be discussed here,"-1' 
but i t would seem that the high fert i l i ty of these strata is an important 
contributing factor to their very limited ability to make effective use 
of the schools. The large number of children in a family does'not prevent 
their attendance for a few years of elementary schooling., but the 
associated over-crowding and malnutrition hamper their ability to learn, 
and as incidental costs mount in the higher years of the school system 
and the possibility of earning by the child appears, the likelihood of 
his continued school attendance becomes very small. 
The geographical redistribution of population complicates the 
problem of distribution of educational services; urban zones of in-migration 
are under particular strain» However, the quality of educational services 
in rural areas and small towns i s generally so poor that there is not likely 
to be much under-utilized capacity even when the child population begins 
to decline. It is more important that the differential ability of the 
cit ies to exert pressure for a share of public educational resources 
insures that the rural schools continue to be starved of funds and served 
by untrained teachers» 
As to the influence of education on demographic change., the negative 
relationship between educational level and fert i l i ty , generally reaching 
significant dimensions for parents with more than four years of schooling 
and increasing the higher the educational level, i s well-known, but the 
causative role of education can hardly be separated from occupation, income 
and, urban residence»^' Once families reach a situation in which they can 
27/ See Chapter III in Education, Human Resources and Development in Latin 
Merio a (United Nations publication, Sales N°: E»68.Ii;G.7)v 
28/ See Chapter IV in Social Change and Social Development Policy in 




realistically expect to be able to maintain their children in school 
long enough to give them future status and occupational advantages, i t 
i s almost inevitable that the advantages of facilitating this by having 
fewer children would come forcibly.to their-attention* 
It has often been repeated that the urban bias of rural education 
in Latin America helps to foster an undesirably high level of cityward 
migration. This i s plausible, but there i s no conclusive proof. 
Investigations to support the different proposition that the possibility 
better education in the city i s a primary or secondary motive for 
many families of migrants and migrant youth. The role of the weak rural 
school in persuading peasant youth to migrate is probably less important 
then the role of the small town school in persuading local youth to seek 
a more "modem" version of urban l i f e . 
The possibility of a direct and intentional impact by the schools 
on reproductive. behaviour and attitudes toward population policy issues, 
through sex education, family l i f e education, and what has been labelled 
concientizacion donografica is only beginning to come under discussion 
and experiment.^/ Such education will probably be extended fairly rapidly 
in the schools attended by children of the urban middle strata. Its 
relevance to the schools of the high fert i l i ty lower strata is much more 
questionable, as long as children attend for only four years or less, 
in pro-adolescent ages, and from cultural backgrounds making communication 
with a teacher on such topics d i f f i cult . Exaggerated hopes have often 
been placed on the potential role of schools, unable to accomplish their 
minimum tasks of imparting literacy and the values of the national 
society, in promoting agricultural innovation, community development, etc«» 
The immediate prospects for demographic and sex education seem no better, 
although in the longer tern, assuming success in more general educational 
reforms and a very great expansion and transformation of adult education, 
their importance may become considerable. 
( i i ) - Health. There i s general agreement on the key role of public 
health and related activities in slashing mortality rates and thus bringing 
about accelerated population growth. This influence has been exercised mainly 
22/ See Informe Final and working document of Reunion de Especialistas 
en Poblacion-JCducacion, organised by Uhesco, Santiago, 28 September-




through activities of relatively low per capita cost and relatively 
undemanding of basic changes in the attitudes and ways of l i f e of the 
beneficiaries: the control of mass diseases through inoculation©, 
insecticides, improved water supplies and sanitation. There is s t i l l a 
good deal of room for improvement in the control and preventive activities. 
In particular, much of the urban population and most of the rural s t i l l 
lacks potable water and safe waste disposal« Air pollution, automotive 
t ra f f i c , and other concomitants of urbanization are bringing new health 
threats that will require control measures. 
At the same tijne, the growth of population, i ts urban concentration, 
and the diffusion of "modem" attitudes through the mass media are 
generating an enoimous demand for curative services. As the experience 
of the high-income countries indicates, the per capita costs of modern 
medical care are extremely hi$i and tend to rise faster than general price 
levels. The capacity of the majority of Latin American families to meet 
such costs from their own resources i s obviously very small, and the 
attempts of the State to do so are very far from meeting the demand. 
Within the over-all trend, the patterns of age distribution mean that 
demands for medical care of children will remain numerically predominant; 
and these demands will be swelled, as long as general living conditions 
do not improve markedly, by poor nutrition, poor sanitation, and deficient 
housing. The same conditions will increase the demand for curative 
services from the population of working age* The population in the upper 
age groups will remain a relatively small part of the total, but i t s 
absolute numbers are growing very rapidly, and adequate medical care for 
these age groups is particularly costly* 
The family planning programmes that are being established within 
public health programmes will have to compete for resources with the 
whole range of preventive and curative services. ^ It can be argued 
plausibly that these programmes will reduce the over-all curative needs 
to the extent that they succeed in reducing fert i l i ty ; that they will 
reduce the present burden on the medical services* of dealing with the 
consequences of botched illegal abortions and that they will in fact 




Similar arguments can be made for nutrition programmes« Nevertheless, 
these hypothetical benefits will not affect the real pressures on the 
health services. The unsatisfied potential don and for curative services 
i s very great, and i s sure to grow stronger whatever the trends in 
f er t i l i ty . In fact, to the extent that families really practice 
"responsible parenthood" they will beccme ever more insistent on the 
medical care of the children they have. As in the case of education, 
demographic trends will intensify pressures that would be present in 
any case, and the reconciliation of these pressures with a sound system 
of priorities for allocation of resources to health i s going to be veiy 
d i f f i cu l t . 
( i i i ) Food supply and nutrition. During recent times, production of 
foods in Latin America has slightly better than kept pace with population 
increase, production capacity in most countries i s undoubtedly adequate to 
maintain this trend during the foreseeable future, or improve i t i f 
appropriate organizational and technological changes are carried out. It i s 
particularly unlikely that food shortages or famine will check population 
growth in" Latin America. 
At the same time, i t i s well-known that present levels of food 
consumption for the majority of the population in most countries are 
seriously deficient. The immediate problems l i e in the inefficient 
organization of agricultural production and distribution (raising the 
costs of foods, making for sluggish response to demand, and bringing 
about wastage of up to 30 per cent of the foodstuffs between producer 
and consumer); in the low incomes that restrict the capacity of the 
majority to acquire enough food, and in the content of the diet, 
determined partly by poverty and partly by ill-advised consumption 
habits. Per capita production of proteins has fallen o f f and i t can be 
deduced that protein malnutrition, already serious among the poorer 
/strata, i s 
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strata, i s becoming more acute. This has particularly ominous implications 
for the future quality of the population, since protein deficiency in 
30/ childhood affects the stature and probably the mental capacity of the adult . - " 
In regard to the distribution of foods, i t hardly needs saying that 
statistically adequate supplies at the national level do not guarantee that 
the poor get enough to eat. At the same time, various dietary investigations 
have indicated a maldistribution of food within low-income families that 
affects particularly the numerous children;- the parents consume most of 
whatever protein-rich foods the family i s able to buy, and the consumption 
31/ 
of protein does not increase with the size of family. 
(ivr) Social security. Social security, in Latin American countries 
with high rates of population increase has thus far been limited to 
relatively small parts of the urban salaried and wage-earning population«. 
The only countries that have managed to extend social security to the greater 
part of their active population are the minority with relatively high 32/ 
degrees of urbanisation and moderate rates of population increase. Thus, 
no clear out influence of social security on demographic change can be 
demonstrated, but there i s an obvious relationship between high population 
increase, with the associated age distribution and traits of the active 
population, and inability to universalize social security. 
Thus far social security legislation and programmes have given 
very inadequate attention to demographic information, while the information 
itself has been inadequate for social security planning. The emphasis 
in most Latin American programmes has been on the provision of medical 
services and on retirement pensions. The former have corresponded to a 
30/ It has been pointed out that protein malnutrition, by reducing the 
stature and vigour of the population also reduces the per capita need 
for foodstuffs. If i t were eliminated, the future adult population 
would be taller and more robust, and at the same time would require 
more food. (Howard A. Osborri, FAO Regional Statistical Advisor for 
Latin America, "Relaciones entre Niveles Nutricionales y Crecimiento 
de Población en América Latina")» 
/ Ibid. 





very strong demand, as indicated above, but have probably responded too 
predominantly to the curative side of the demand, have not been based 
on clear conceptions of priority health needs, and have not been 
co-ordinated with health services provided by other public agencies» 
Retirement pensions have commonly involved inequities between different 
groups covered by social security and the age for entitlement has commonly 
been set unrealistic ally low. As l i f e expectancies rise and larger 
numbers of beneficiaries pass the ages of entitlement the systems became 
increasingly unable to meet their obligations. The only alternatives to 
more realistic actuarial bases for pensions - politically .extremely 
di f f icult - are bankruptcy or dependence on inflation to .wipe out most 
of the burden of pension payment. 
Very few of the systems have tried to relate themselves to the 
predominance of children and youth of dependent ages in the population 
structures. Aside from the provision of medical services to the families 
of covered workers, the main way in which this could be done would be 
through family allowances to redress the disadvantages brought about by 
the combination of numerous children and low-incernes. It is often argued 
that family allowances would constitute an undesirable incentive to 
continuation of high fert i l i ty . This cannot be demonstrated, although 
the argument would probably have some validity i f applied ta> families 
eking out a precarious day-to-day existence, in which children * s 
allowances might be the largest and the only dependable part of total 
income. Family allowance systems seem to have had no generalized effect 
on fert i l i ty in the European countries in which they have been provided • 
for many years, often with the deliberate intention of encouraging 
larger families. The few Latin American countries that have introduced 
family allewances within social security are Uruguay, with low fert i l i ty , / 
and Chile and Costa Rica, both with declining fer t i l i ty . It seems:reasonable 
to expect that children's allowances, particularly i f combined with well-
conceived health, nutritional and social welfare services for children 
would, on balance, promote responsible parenthood and rational controls 
on fer t i l i ty . However, the dif f icult ies in the way of provision of such 




the accompaniment of much wider changes in societal priorities, economic 
organization and income distribution. The financing of family allowances 
by payroll taxes, making them part of the wage b i l l , means in practice a 
redistribution of income within certain strata of the wage-earners, with 
part of the costs passed on to consumers of the products of the covered 
occupations - including the marginal families that receive no benefits. 
The public sector,, under prevailing conditions, would be quite unable to 
finance children's allowances for a l l families with incomes too low for 
33/ 
them to meet a defined standard of needs for their children.*2-4' 
(v) Housing. There i s no evidence that housing deficiencies up to 
the present have had any clear out influence on demographic trends in 
Latin America. I t i s probable that bad housing contributes to higher 
mortality rates, but this factor cannot be separated from other 
unfavourable aspects of the environment. It i s also probable that housing 
shortages and high costs of housing enter into the motives that induce 
families c f the urban middle strata to have fewer children. It does not . 
seem that even the worst degrees of over-crowding or dif f icult ies of newly 
formed families in finding living quarters have appreciable effects on 
the fer t i l i ty of the poorer strata. In fact, once over-crowding and 
inability to meet the costs of conventional housing reach a certain point, 
these strata solve their problem through the well-known expedient of 
unconventional and unregulated types of shelter« 
Public housing programmes have sometimes been accused, along with 
other urban services provided by the State, of stimulating the excessive 
flow of migrants to the large c i t ies . It would be hard, however, to 
demonstrate direct stimuli of this kind. Investigations among urban . 
22/ According to the report of the Inter-Agency Team on employment policy 
in Colombia, " it i s in any case questionable whether, any country with 
a demographic problem like Colombia's can afford a family allowance 
system... I t may be argued that the purpose i s welfare, but family 
allowances are paid primarily to those with jobs in the modern sector 
(and government service), not to the unemployed or rural workers whose 
moral claim is incomparably greater. In any case the most effective 
form of protecting children from the consequences of poverty i s to 
provide them with free milk and other forms of nourishment directly, 
through clinics and schools." (Towards Full Employment. International 




migrants do not indicate that the hope of better housing has any importance 
among the motives for migration» Moreover, given the dimensions of even 
the larger public housing programmes, migrants would have no access to 
such housing before several years1 residence in the city. There may, 
however, be an indirect influence of sane importance: large public, 
housing programmes create opportunities for unskilled and seini-skilled 
labour of the kind migrants can of fer , and thus may attract a larger flow» 
In this respect, housing does not dif fer from any large-scale public works 
projecto 
From the other standpoint - the influence of demographic change on 
housing levels and housing programmes — the combination of rapid growth and 
concentrated urbanization has faced the State with unmanageable demands, 
and compelled the diversion of important public resources into housing 
programmes that have done very l i t t l e to meet the needs of the poorer 
urban strata and practically nothing for the rural population«-^ Public 
programmes are now turning perforce to lower cost solutions intended to 
supplement the efforts of the families themselves: provision of urbanized, 
building lots and materials, and various schemes of aided self-help» 
Nevertheless, housing demands with a strong political appeal are sure to 
exert very heavy pressures on public resources and organizational 
capacities throughout the foreseeable future» 
Any reduction in the rate of population increase would not begin 
to affect the quantitative demand for new dwelling units for nearly twenty 
years, since this depends on the rate of formation of new families by 
young adults. It would affect the qualitative aspects of the need almost 
immediately, since small dwelling units would be less inadequate for 
families with fewer children. 
(vi) Social welfare and other services relating to family and community 
l i f e . A discussion of relations between these forms of public social 
action and demographic change would have to be couched almost entirely 
in terms of future possibilities» Up to the present, the coverage of 





social welfare, 'community development and related programmes has been 
too limited to have any effect on demographic change, even i f designed 
to do so, which has not been the case. 
Quite recently, family planning advocates have begun to look to 
social welfare programmes and social workers as potential resources for 
the dissemination of receptiveness to family-planning, particularly among 
the marginal families. Efforts are beginning to give the training of 
social workers a demographic content. The results in terms of more effective 
promotion of family welfare may be of some importance, but i t does not 
seem !) ikely that the quantitative demographic trends will be affected 
significantly, 
(c) Employment 
In countries with the demographic structures and trends typical of 
Latin America the population in economically active ages i s increasing 
by about 3 per cent annually. This potential labour force i s predominantly 
youthful, particularly i ts urban component. It can plausibly be conjectured 
that in the larger countries with their high rates of urbanization and 
movement of population out of agriculture, new entrants to the male 
population seeking work in occupations other than agriculture each year 
amount to about 7 per cent of the total size of this population, or even 
more. As the population becomes predominantly urban and the movement 
out of agriculture declines in relative importance, as is bound to happen 
in these countries this, percentage will fa l l to about 5 , as long as the 
over-all population growth rate remains at 3 per cent. Under favourable 
circumstances an abundant and youthfully adaptable labour force of this kind 
might be expected to be a vexy positive element for industrialisation, and 
35/ this seems to hn.ve been the case, in some countries at l e a s t A t present 
In Mexico, « el crecimiento industrial se ha visto favorecido por una 
oferta abundante y creciente de mano de obra provocada por el intenso 
proceso de migracion de la poblacion rural a zonas urbanas, lo que 
ademas ha facilitado que los salaries reales se mantuviesen en niveles 
relativamente "bajos e incluso decrecieran durante un largo plazo 
(hasta 1956)". The abundant supply of cheap labour also favoured 
the expansion of commercial agriculture in previously unexploited zones, 
and the large-scale construction of roads and irrigation systems that 
supported this expansion. However, the acceleration of population 
growth also "ccmplico e l proceso ayudando que el descenso de los . 
salarios reales se prolongara por un tiempo probablemente mayor del 





however, the slowness in growth of new opportunities for productive employment, 
the widening gap between skil l requirements in technologically advanced 
industries and the qualifications of the potential labour force, and wage 
rigidities that prevent ready Absorption of low-productivity labour, mean 
that increasing unemployment and. marginalization of the potentially active 
population are looked on as probably the most dangerous shortcoming in 
the trends of economic growth for the immediate future. This question 
wil l be discussed elsewhere and need not be treated further at this point© 
It i s obvious that even the most drastic reduction in fert i l i ty 
rates will' not affect the rate of increase of the population in active 
ages for at least'15 years, and can have only a secondary., influence, 
compared to other factors bearing on the percentage of the population 
of active ages actually seeking work, for several years after that. 
Any important decline in fer t i l i ty would in al l probability be accompanied 
by an increase in the proportion of women entering the labour force, 
and thus in the over-all pressure for expansion of employment 
Discussion of the effects of employment on demographic change has 
centered on this last point. In the high-income industrialized countries, 
increased participation of women in the labour force has consistently 
been associated with declining fer t i l i ty , and i t seems logical that this 
should be so, whatever the cause and effect relationship. The few 
relevant studies that have been made in Latin America confirm the 
relationship for urban women, although not in a very pronounced way. 
Throughout Latin America female participation in the labour force i s 
quite low compared to the countries of Europe and North America. In 
most Latin American countries, fewer than 20 per cent of the women of 
working age (15-64) are active, rising to 25 per cent in the countries 
with relatively low fert i l i ty , while in Western Europe 43 per cent and 
in Eastern Europe nearly 60 per cent are active. The low rates of 
participation in' such countries as Argentina and Uruguay, in which the 
burden of child care is no more important than in Europe as a hindrance 
to female labour, suggests that the slack overv-all demand for labour 
¿6/ See Chapter IV., Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin 
America. 
/ ( i n combination 
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(in combination with a probably declining cultural prejudice) keeps 
female participation low, and throughout Latin America this is sure to 
continue to be an important factor restricting any major impact on 
fert i l i ty . It has also been pointed out that the inhibiting relation 
exercised by female participation on fert i l i ty i s probably limited to 
participation in the modern urban wage-earning activities. Increased 
participation in the traditional forms of agricultural labour, artisanal 
activity, home piecework, and vending would probably have no effect» 
Employment of young women in domestic service presumably has some retarding 
effect on family formation by them, but domestic service seems fairly 
certain to account for a declining share of female participation in the 
labour force almost everywhere. 
In the industrialized countries during the twentieth century-
fluctuations in fert i l i ty have increasingly been associated with major 
\ 
changes in levels of employment and economic security. Fertility rates 
dropped during the depression years of 1930s and the subsequent years 
of war, then rose to unexpected heights, confounding previous predictions 
of low demographic increase, during the years of nearly fu l l employment 
following the Second World War»- Similar relationships might be expected 
in such countries as Argentina and Uruguay, but i t seems probable that 
the depressive effects on fert i l i ty of unemployment and insecurity depend 
on the contrast with a previous period of relative prosperity» The 
high rates of unemployment and underemployment in Latin America, among 
populations mainly without previous experience of modern wage labour, 
and accompanied by uneven exposutfe to different features of modernization, 
have unprecedented traits that make i t impossible to predict their 
impact, i f any» 
(d) ' Saving 
Capacity for personal saving obviously should have a direct 
relationship with size of inccme and - ceteris Paribus - an inverse 
relationship at each income level with size of family. It has been 
argued that reduction of fert i l i ty would bring about significant 
increases in savings available for capital fomation and thus contribute 
to more rapid development. In i ts application to Latin America,- however, 
/ this argument 
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this argument needs to be carefully qualified and some observers go so 
far as to deny i t any importance, largely because of the extremely uneven 
distribution of incomes and the association of low incomes with high 
fer t i l i ty . The consumption levels of the low-income strata are so low 
that i t mi^ht take at . least two decades before any of the per capita income 
gains that may realistically be expected would permit them to mnke a 
significant contribution to personal savings. In other strata « which for the 
most part are already attaining moderate fert i l i ty - changing cultural and 
other influences on the propensity to save will probably be of greater 
importance than fert i l i ty changes. Moreover, the strong pressure toward 
new forms of consumption that i s now evident means that the diversification 
of consumption would immediately absorb any relative improvement in income 
that might be achieved by reduction of f er t i l i ty . 
Such arguments, while valid up to a point, do not confront the real 
potential importance of lower fert i l i ty for the use of family income. 
The assertion that low-income families cannot save is exaggerated, although 
their savings may not take conventional forms or contribute directly to 
investment in productive equipment. The ability of urban low^income 
families to devote a substantial part of their incomes to housing, once 
they have the opportunity and some assurance of security in this investment, 
is ah impressive example. The potential economic importance of a lesser 
burden of fert i l i ty in such families would l i e in the opportunity of 
"investing" in improvement of the quality of their children as human 
resources. Whether this opportunity would be realized would depend on 
the choices made by the families in disposal of their incomes, and this 
in turn would depend on the traits of the future society and the kinds 
of consumption i t stimulates. Present trends, with increasing strain 
exerted upon the inccmes of all social strata to respond to the "modern" 
consumption appeals disseminated by the mass media, suggest that this 
strain may exert a depressive effect on the fert i l i ty of population 
strata that are beginning to enter,the market for modern consumer goods, 
but that lower fert i l i ty may not be reflected either in investable savings 





The pressures exerted by rapid population increase and urban 
concentration upon the capacity of the public sector to save and invest 
must also be taken into account» In the past, some of the countries 
have been able to maintain substantial rates of public investment in 
production and infrastructure only because most of the basic needs of 
the low-income strata - for education, housing, health care, incomes 
adequate for subsistence. - could be ignored. This is no longer the case, 
as was stated above i t would be unrealistic to expect that lower fert i l i ty 
and slower urbanization will bring about any alleviation of these pressures,, 
but such demographic changes would help the public authorities to respond 
to them in a more meaningful way» 
(e) Land use and tenure 
In an isolated and static rural society, the main consequences of 
population increase for an indefinite period might be the gradual -expansion 
of the area under cultivation or gradual impoverishment, depending on 
the availability of land» Both of these processes are visible in the 
rural zones of Latin America, but these zones are no longer isolated 
or static. Population increase combines with a number of other forces, 
inter-related but not all acting in the same direction, to make the 
pre-existing patterns of land tenure, cultivation, marketing, neighbourhood 
ties and urban-rural relationships less and less viable» In their 
present combinations, these forces point to widening disparities between 
rural population groups able to cope with change and the "marginalized" 
remainder, and increasing pressures on the State ahd the urban economy 
to absorb or subsidize the "superfluous" part of the rural labour force« 
The importance of the problem within the national picture of economic 
and social change, and the feasibility of policies to deal with i t , i s 
conditioned by the size of the country, the rate of population increase, 
and the degree of urbanization already reached, but the problem itsel f 
can be identified even in countries in which net rural population growth 
has fallen to zero and the urban population is in the majority* 
/In al l 
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In al l of the types of countries distinguished in 2 above, agricultural 
enterprises now have at their disposal a wide range of techniques for 
increasing production with a stationary or declining labour force, whether 
or not they are economically or socially justified in using them. 
Subsistence production and local markets are declining in importance in 
relation to production for the national market, with consequent pressures 
toward rationalization of production and distribution. Rural non-
agricultural sources of income tend to contract, although some new ones 
appear» Even the remoter rural zones are increasingly penetrated by 
influences that work against geographical immobility and passive acceptance . 
of poverty: roads and cheap public transportation, mass communication 
media, public education and health services, and political appeals of 
urban origin. Within the range of present settlement patterns and forms 
of land tenure, the traditional haciendas and. the minifundio settlements 
are both expelling excess population and absorbing l i t t l e of the rural 
natural increase» The growing settlements of landless rural workers 
along the roadsides or on the fringes of the small towns demonstrate 
that an increasing share of the rural population finds no alternative 
to marginalized poverty» "Planned" agrarian reform and colonization 
settlements, which thus far account for a very small fraction of the rural 
population, do have the potentiality, i f really vigorous agrarian reform 
policies are applied, 6f greatly increasing the capacity of agriculture 
to absorb labour productively and thus the capacity of rural areas to 
retain population. At best, however, this capacity has limitations» 
The new settlements will be able to offer incomes satisfactory to their 
members only i f they restrict their numbers to those required for efficient 
operation and exercise selectivity. They cannot be expected to absorb 
the whole of the excess rural labour force, particularly the more marginal 
part of i t . ^ 
The forces at work, in their varying combinations, rule out the 
policy sometimes proposed, that most of the rural population increase 
should be retained in agricultural occupation until the urban economy 
37/ For a fuller discussion of these questions see Chapters III and ¥11 




becomes able to absorb productively the surplus rural labour force. Such 
policies could be applied only through rigidly authoritarian tactics that 
are neither practicable nor acceptable, or through an absolute lack of urban 
opportunities. The rural population would not even be able to maintain 
present levels of living, and these levels, sustained by primitive hand labour, 
are no longer acceptable to the rural masses, particularly the youth, 
( f ) Natural resources and space 
Except In a few of the smaller countries of Latin America^ natural 
resource endowment does not stand in the way of the support of larger 
populations at levels of living higher than at present, i f the investments 
needed to take advantage of the resources can be mobilised, although these 
resources are rarely well-balanced or easy of access. It can be affirmed 
that several internal regions require a larger population for the efficient 
exploitation of their resources for development. The diff iculty l ies in the 
high global rates of national population increase and in the use or misuse of 
natural resources associated with present trends of economic, social and 
technological change. 
Present use of renewable natural resources, particularly land, is 
extremely wasteful and destructive. Although the traditional optimistic 
view that the Latin American resource endowment is inexhaustible is s t i l l 
influential, i t is now obvious that this is very far from true and that 
resources are now being squandered at an alarming rate. The monopolization 
of land that is most accessible and best suited for cultivation by the 
haciendas, has compelled overuse of the poorer hillside lands by minifundio 
cultivators, followed by soil exhaustion, erosion, and destruction-of forest 
cover. Similar* patterns have been reproduced by squatter settlement and 
slash-and-burn cultivation in areas that are s t i l l very thinly populated. 
Some forms of modern plantation agriculture also produce exhaustion and 
abandonment of huge land areas. Lumbering operations and f ires are destroying 
forests without any provision for replacement. Even the resources of the sea 
are being threatened by uncontrolled exploitation. While population pressure 
i s speeding up the process of destruction, i t is not the crucial factor. In 
many densely settled regions elsewhere, peasant agriculture has continued for 




Latin America the destruction is' greatest in thinly settled rural areas. 
Primitive systems of land use and systems that are technologically advanced 
and highly mechanized both contribute to the destruction« .At both ends 
of the spectrum investment and the application of technology to land 
maintenance a$d improvement has been very small, compared either to such 
countries of peasant agriculture as China or to countries of modern 
"industrialized" agrigulture, such as the United States. Reversal of the 
trend will require both large investments and a different approach to 
technological innovation. Bringing into use the nearly empty regions cf 
Latin America - which are s t i l l pointed to in "populationist1* arguments -
in a manner that will not insure their destruction will require particularly 
enormous and carefully planned investments. 
Non-renewable natural resources (mainly petroleum and metal ores) 
are being exploited for export as intensively as markets and technological 
resources permit, because of their key role in supplying the foreign 
exchange needed to keep the economies going. It is likely that by the time 
a much larger and more industrially advanced population requires these 
resources for domestic use, some of them will be exhausted and others 
obt-ainable ^only at higher cost. 
Urban concentration and the rising importance in the urban level of 
living of certain forms of consumption - durable goods, travel, etc. -
generate per capita demands on natural resources much greater than in 
any past civilization, along with the increasingly ominous by-products 
of air and water pollution, noise and enormous quantities of perishable 
and imperishable garbage that must be disposed of somewhere. 
A peasant population can reach a high degree of density i f the land 
i s fert i le and well-cultivated, without insuperable strains on resources 
or social organization. Within narrower limits, urban populations can 
also reach considerable size as long as the majority accepts low levels 
of living, limited spatial mobility, and high density of settlement. 
To the extent that the income levels and aspirations of the population 
rise, so that they travel extensively within the urban area and outside, 
purchase durable consumer goods, demand houses with gardens, and take 
vacations at the seaside or other resort areas* the strains on natural 




The high-income countries are now struggling with problems of this 
kind and have encountered a recognized deterioration of certain aspects 
of living conditions that offsets the gains represented by higher consumption 
levels« The Latin American countries, especially the larger more dynamic 
and more urbanized countries are now running into the s ame problems at 
much lower income levels and with much more limited capacity to absolve the 
resource and organizational problems» If private automobile ownership 
continues to expand at present rates, for example, the increasingly dispersed 
low density pattern or urbanization will make the costs of highways and 
other infrastruetural investment increasingly prohibitive; enormous quantities 
of agricultural land will be devoured by urban sprawl, urban air pollution 
will become gradually worse and rising consumption of gasoline might 
eventually curtail the export role of petroleum for some countries and 
place an increasing strain on the balance of payments of others that import 
petroleum products. / 
Calculations of the quantities of non-renewable resources that would 
be needed i f the rest of the world were to begin to use these resources at 
the rate already reached by the United States demonstrate that this would 
be out of the question. The United States, with 6 per cent of the world 
population, consumes half the world production of the more important 
38/ 
minerals»*2-' It has. been estimated that at the current United States 
consumption level, the world could support a population of only 500 million, 
compared to the present 3,000 millions and the 7*000 millions likely in the 
year 2000» This i s only one of the factors calling into question the 
viability for Latin America of the present models ¿for development offered 
by the highr-income countries. The opportunities offered by new technologies 
for substitution of raw materials and sources of energy, for re-cycling 
of water and minerals and for permanent high-yield exploitation of land 
resources and the sea are a sufficient promise of capacity to support the 
inevitable larger populations, but the promise will not be realized without 
realistic measures for the husbanding of natural resources and the channelling 
of consumption along lines that will not generate insoluble future problems 
and that will be compatible with fair access by the whole of the population. 
38// Stuart Kudd, Ed. The Population Crisis and the Use of World 
N Resources. Dr. W. Gunk, Publishers, The Hague, 1964j P* 238. 
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4# Population policies 
(a) Delimitation of population policy 
Various latin American political leaders have proposed population 
policies since the 19th Century, and Governments have undertaken measures 
with the specific purpose of influencing population growth and distribution. 
It i s only in the latter pert of the 1960s, however, and in the context, 
of changing* and confl ict ! ve conceptions of the nature of the population 
problem, that the question has come to the fore of delimiting population 
policy and determining its place within the continually widening range o f 
interventions by the Stat© in the economy and society© This task has 
faced an initial contradictions The "population" - the human race - ie 
the subject and object of a l l public policy. It would be possible, 
although not very useful, to subsume a l l social and economic development 
programmes under "population policy". At the same time, the. range of 
activities open to the public sector for direct intervention in demographic 
change i s narrow. The public activities that have the greatest actual 
or potential, influence on demographic variables are governed mainly by 
policy considerations in which this influence is secondary or disregarded. 
Other important influences fa l l outside the scope of public policy, whether 
because of prevailing values or beratiág''practical d i f f i cult ies rule out 
public intervention. 
The contradiction has manifested i t se l f , as several observers 
have pointed out, in policy formulations too broad to be operational 
juxtaposed with a nearly exclusive concentration o f attention, both in 
polemics and in operational programmes, on "family planning" as a means 
of influencing the fert i l i ty variable. 
The most ambitious attempt to formulate a definition was made by a 
Meeting on Population Policies in Relation to Development in latin 
America, held in Caracas in September 1967, following a Preparatory 
Seminar held in Washington, D.C. in Eferch 196?í. 
"Debe entenderse por política de población el conjunto coherente 
de decisiones: que conforman una estrategia racional adoptada por el 
sectoir público, de acuerdo a las necesidades y aspiraciones de la 




influyendo sobre la magnitud y el crecimiento probables de la, población, 
su distribución por edades, la constitución y composición de las 
familias, la localización regional o rural-urbana de los habitantes, 
y la incorporación a la fuerza de trabajo y a la educación, con el 
f in de faci l i tar los objetivos del crecimiento económico y posibilitar 
la participación de la población en las responsabilidades y beneficios 
del progreso 
This definition has been subjected to a good deal of c i ' i i ic ism,^/ 
and there is now wide consensus, that a narrower definition is needed, 
limiting the scope of population policy to measures intended to influence 
population growth and distribution, with the proviso that such population 
policy must be integrated into an over-all development policy. Such a 
policy should seek, f i r s t , an adequate understanding of the implications 
of these demographic varia blefe and the constraints they impose on the 
other areas of development policy, and, second, means of compatibilization 
and mutual support among the whole range of measures affecting these 
19/ This meeting was co-sponsored by the Organization of American 
States, the Pan American Health Organization, the Population 
Council, and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, with 
the collaboration of the Government of Venezuela. Ministers 
and other public functionaries from 15 countries participated 
in personal capacities, along with invited experts. 
ZjiO/ "Se torna d i f í c i l en estas circunstancias trazar una clara linea 
divisoria entre política de población y política económica y social, 
en general. Es esta dificultad la que debe haber llevado a los 
redactores de la definición* de política de población que se adoptó 
en una reciente conferencia,, a darle al término una acepción tan 
amplia que prácticamente quedaron englobados dentro de ella todos 
los objetivos del desarrollo." (Carmen A, Miró, "Política de 
Poblacións Qué? Por Que? Para Qué? Cómo?".)/The revision of the 
definition proposed by the Preparatory SeminarJ ^se produjo 
media.nte supresiones, sustituciones y adiciones que reflejan 
claramente el 'tira y afloja1 de las distintas posiciones en juego. 
El resultado es'la típica definición que deja contentos a todos, 
pero que resulta inoperante tanto para un análisis teórico, como 
para una orientación de la acción polít ica." (Gerardo González C., 
"Políticas de Población y Mkrginalidad Social11). ejemplo de esta 
confusión está constituido por lo que planteó como objetivos de una 
política de población el informe final . . . Si, en efecto, quisiera 
incluirse en lo poblacional todo aquello que tiene consecuencias en 
la población o de ella se deriva, téndrían que enumerarse todos los 
sectores o aspectos que constituyen una sociedad," (Roger Vekémans,S.J. 
"Política de Población? Esbozo de"Status Quaestionis", DESAL, 
Santiago de Chile, Agosto de 1970.) /variables. The 
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variables. The proviso points in the right direction for the future, but does 
not .show how to solve the main immediate problems: 
(1) In spite of a decade of development planning experiences, 
hardly any of the countries as yet have authentic, coherent and functioning 
development policies or strategies capable of providing the needed frame 
of reference for policies of demographic rationalization. As long as 
social and economic policy remains fragmented and sectoral, determined in 
large part by the relative strength of pressures from professional and 
bureaucratic group®, electoral clienteles, and the external sources of 
financial aid and technical co-operation, with the more specific programes 
and regulations even within sectoral policy areas often conflicting 
directly in their import, i t can hardly be expected that whatever 
activities are grouped under population policy can avoid taking on similar 
traits. In this respect, the problems of delimiting and formulating 
population policies resemble those faced by a l l of the broad inter-sectoral 
middle-range objectives that have been advanced as essential to development, 
such as income redistribution and human resources p o l i c y . ^ / 
(2) Demographers are not yet in a position to offer the public 
authorities incontrovertible advice on the inter-relationships between 
demographic change and development, or on the fu l l long-term consequences 
of the.measures that can be taken. This deficiency, like similar 
deficiencies in the other inter-sectoral policy areas, derives only partly 
from the dearth of basic research; the inter-relationships and consequences 
depend on prior definition of the patterns of development aspired to within 
specific types of countries. The character of the information needed on 
such topics as population redistribution, urbanization, occupation, and 
family structures also depends on the formulation of clear demands by 
development policy makers. 
LQj See Chapters X and XI in Social Change and Social Development Policy.., 
in latin America., Carmen A. Miré, op, cit.7T.av particular stress, on 
the need for , and present lack of , development policies into which 
population policies can .be integrated. 
/ (3) The 
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(3) The dependence of future demographic change on trends and 
policies in employment, education, income levels and distribution, and 
technological innovations of many kinds, means that the measures 
governed primarily by population policy considerations will always 
have a secondary or auxiliary role - although this may be of considerable 
importance - within the over-all picture of influences on the-demographic 
variables.. Policies in a l l of these areas should take population 
objective© into account - once these are clearly formulated - and should 
make much fuller use than heretofore of the light that demographic 
analysis can throw on the feasibility of their targets and techniques, 
but in the definition of these policies other considerations, as 
important as their demographic consequences or more so, have to be 
taken into account. The potentially important area of policy for 
strengthening of the family, which now exists only in the form of small-
scale and unco-ordinated initiatives, is bound to be much influenced by 
the dissemination of "family planning" in the narrow sense, but even 
here demographic objectives wil l have to be subordinated to objectives 
deriving from conceptions of human, rights and the developmental role 
of the family. Policies affecting the geographical distribution of the 
population, which even the more restricted definitions bring within the 
scope of population policy, are in practice more likely to be dealt with 
in the context of regional development, urban development, and rural 
development policy. 
(b) Conceptions and ideologies concerning the role of population in 
latin American development 
Several historical stages can be identified in predominant 
Latin American attitudes toward population, each associated with 
determined economic and social patterns, forms of inter-dependence with 
the rest of the world, and conceptions of the sources of national progress. 
(1) From the time of independence in the early 19th century 
I up to thfi 1920s % national progress and power were identified with rapid 
increase and "Europeanization" of the population. This predominant 
ideology (which encountered varying degrees of resistance from 




economies almost entirely oriented toward raw material exports and with 
the domination of landowning-commercial élites convinced of the ethnic 
inferiority of the nasses of the population. Populations during this 
period were very small in relation to territory, rates of natural increase 
were low, and urbanisation limited. European migrants were available in 
large numbers and the countries able to attract them forged ahead of the 
rest of the region economically in polit ical stability; population increase 
through immigration meant that most of the increment could be incorporated 
directly into the labour force, at the modest ski l l levels called for by 
existing systems of production, the costs of up-bringing having been met 
by the country of origin. 
(2) From the 1920s to the 1960s. The desirability of rapid 
population increase continued unquestioned, but a higher valuation was 
placed on the native population and more stress was placed on the need 
to raise its quality through education and other social measures. 
Accelerating urbanization was looked on with optimism as a stimulus to 
development through concentration of consumer demand and occupational 
skil ls . These views were associated with rising nationalism and the 
defense of indigenous against European and North American cultural traits; 
with a rapid growth of politically articulate urban middle strata; with 
a partial drying up of the preferred sources of migration; that coincided 
during the 1930s with economic depression, urban unemployment, and legal 
restrictions on immigration; with a change from the export-oriented 
economic patterns toward the growth (particularly during the 1940s and 
1950s,),,, of import substitution industries offering new job opportunities 
in the cities; and with a widening acceptance of development policies 
reding on industrialisation, international financial and technical 
co-operation, Latin American integration, formal long-term planning, and 
socio-economic structural reforms. 
(3) From the early 1960s to the present. Interpretations of the -
role of population change have become increasingly divergent, ccnflictive 
and ideologically charged® This stage is associated with partial 
frustration of the hopes invested in the global development policies 




rwmbers of persons annually reaching working age, as a result of the 
speeding'up of population growth since the 1940s; with the rapidly 
increasing vis ibi l i ty and scope of the problems of urban roarginality, 
structural unemployment and under-utilization of human resources; with 
the widening gap between aspirations for social services and 
realizations; with the increasingly complex impact of technological and 
organisational innovations and consumption appeals originating in the 
high-income industrialized countries; with growing technical capacity 
for direct action on some components of demographic growth; and with 
the relatively sudden extension to latin America of a world-wide 
campaign insisting on the catastrophic consequences of continued 
population expansion and on family planning as the only remedy0 
At the present state, while the previous optimistic views and the 
traditional identification of national power with population size 
continue current and influential, several newer positions can be 
distinguished, each with a number of variants: 
(1) Important sectors of opinion continue to envisage "development" 
as primarily the attainment of higher rates of increase in production and 
consumption, so as to close the gap between present levels and those of 
the typical North American or European country, and to assume that this 
can be dohe i f the development and structural reform policies agreed 
upon during the past decade are applied more vigorously, and i f 
international co-operation in tirade and financial aid becomes more 
generous and more dependable. From this point of view, the absorption 
of the urban marginal population - and the underemployed rural population 
that feeds- i ts growth - into productive employment and fu l l participation 
in the social order depends primarily on the attainment of a high rate 
of economic growth. Any effective measure reducing the rate of growth 
of the population strata exposed to marginalize tion or reducing the 
rate of migration of these strata toward the cities alleviates the 
pressures for non-productive use of public resources, reduces the 
likelihood of violence, and gives the national authorities more time and 
greater f lexibi l ity in assigning resources to high-priority developmental 




advocacy of population control as an altemative to accelerated 
development, but i t is improbable that anyone thinks in these terms. 
(2) At the other extreme i t is asserted that a strategy of 
development based on the premises summarised above would, even i f feasible, 
produce nothing more than an unjust and inacceptable pseudo-development, 
perpetuating a noxious situation of dependency. It is inferred that 
authentic development will be possible only after revolutionary 
transforation of existing power structures and a breaking of the bonds 
of dependence. From this point of view, the dependent system of economic 
growth generates the growth of the marginal population by its very nature, 
and this constitutes one of the contradictions that will eventually bring 
about the breakdown of the system. Under present conditions, any measures 
of population control, i f effective, would alleviate tensions and thus 
prolong the survival of economic and social structures that should 
disappear as soon as possible to make way for the building of a new 
social order. This position can easily be caricatured as an advocacy of 
increasing social pressures for the sake of provoking immediate changes. 
In some of i ts manifestations i t does seem to involve a certain 
insensitivity to the immediate needs of the low-income strata, as well 
as a high degree of optimism concerning later capacity to meet these 
needs» 
(3) A third point of view stresses the human welfare implications 
of rapid population growth and the right of the family to have access to 
means of limiting the number of children, irrespective of thp implications 
for development and of public policy concerning population increase. 
This point of view is compatible with almost any interpretation of the 
development process and its requisites, but is commonly accompanied 
by a degree of skepticism concerning the abil ity of the public authorities 
to apply population policies based on the more ambitious developmental 
conceptions, and a willingness to settle for fragmentary measures 
responding to the immediate needs of families. Some advocates of this 
position limit their support to a certain range of family p3.ann.ing 
techniques considered morally legitimate, while others are prepared to 
support the free availability of abortion and other means. 
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(4) A fourth point of view, more complex and hard to summarize, 
accepts the human rights argument and also considers lower rates of 
population increase highly desirable for a l l the Latin American countries 
that have not yet undergone a demographic transition, whatever their 
future pattern of development. At the same time, the holders of this 
point of view feel that both the developmental urgency and the appropriate 
content of policies for demographic rationalization differ widely 
according to the circumstances of specific countries, that the relevance 
of such policies to the alleviation of pressures arising from 
marginslization is questionable, whether such alleviation is viewed as 
desirable or not, and that the capacity of the 5tate to control 
population growth during the foreseeable future through the techniques 
now being advocated wil l probably be of much less importance than the 
changes in family l i f e and cultural attitudes brought about by ongoing 
social and economic changes. This point of view accepts as partly valid 
the assertion that present campaigns for population control derive from 
determined conceptions of dependent development and are designed to 
facilitate the survival, with whatever reforms and improvements, of 
present economic and social structures. It does not accept the inference 
that such expectations constitute sufficient reasons to support 
reject the policies themselves, or take for granted that the results 
cf the policies will necessarily correspond to the expectations 
of their sponsors. It assumes that in the short term, the developmental 
effects of such policies will be limited and more important for the 
welfare of families than for the resource allocation problems faced by 
the State, but that attention cannot be limited to the short term. 
(5) Yet another position might be distinguished among some 
proponents of development policies and analysts of social change: to 
ignore the p o p u l a t i o n problem altogether or to deny its importance, 
with the conscious or unconscious aim of minimizing any distraction of 
public attention from problem areas believed to be more urgent and more 
manipulable. 
In the prolonged polemic over population policy, many intermediate 




position is not nade explicit . Public declarations on population policy 
tend to be phrased in terms intended to disarm attack or avoid stirring 
up political or religious sensitivities, and the strong terms in which 
the urgency of the problem is stated contrast with the ambiguity • of 
the recommendations. Meanwhile, the unofficial polemics tend to remain 
a dialogue of the deaf, in which the parties refute their own caricatured 
version of the opposing position, or the supposedly inacceptable motives 
of i t s proponents, particularly when the strong support given by certain 
powers outside latin America to determined population policies come© 
under discussion. The position taken by the main external source of 
development aid and advice has produced, on the one hand, a sometimes 
grudging acceptance of population control as one item in a "package" 
of policies expected financial aid, and, on the other hand, an automatic 
rejection of the desirability of control in the sectors of opinion 
preoccupied with dependence, 
(c) Governmental policies and attitudes 
Depending on the definition adopted, i t can be affirmed that no 
country in latin America has a population policy or that practically 
a l l of them do. Two Presidents of Latin American countries (Colombia 
and Dominican Republic) and two Prime Ministers of Caribbean countries 
(Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago) signed the 1967 Declaration of Chiefs of 
State on the Population Problem, which combined a strong affirmation 
of the danger of rapid population increase with exclusive support of 
family planning as the remedy. In about half the countries, Chiefs 
of State or Ministers since 1967 have made public statements affirming 
or denying the desirability of lower rates of population increase. 
With some countries, leading public o f f i c ia l s have expressed widely 
divergent views on population ob ject ives .^ / 
¿2 / In Brazil, in 1969, "de cuatro discursos de gobierno, tres fueron 
favorables a una política demográfica restrictiva y uno fue en 
favor de la política expansionista". (Glycon de Paiva, "Política 
Demográfica para el Brasil - Dificultades para Establecerla".) 
See also Rubens Vaz da Costa (Presidente del Banco de Nordeste do 
Brasil), "El Crecimiento de la Población y el Desarrollo Económico: 




Only one Government, that of Colombia, has incorporated broad population 
policy criteria and objectives (based on the Caracas Conference definition) 
into i t s most recent development plan, presented to Congress for appi-oval 
at the end of 1969J^ No Government has as yet fixed quantitative 
objectives for changes in the demographic variables J ^ 
43/ The bases for the Colombián population policy are the following: 
na) Criterios : 
1, El Estado debe intervenir con el establecimiento de una política, 
• en cuanto el bien del conjunto social está comprometido, tanto a 
nivel ir&cro-económico, como a nivel de la familia y del individuo, 
pero respetando sus derechos e intimidad* 
2. la política de población se considera como un componente indis-
pensable de la política general de desarrollo y por lo tanto se 
da énfasis a la educación integral. 
b) Objetivosg 
Dos son los objetivos inmediatos: lograr Una mejor distribución 
territotial de la población y modificar e l actual ritmo de creci-
miento de la población por medio de una reducción de la fecundidad 
Con relación a l segundo objetivo de reducción del crecimiento de 
la población, por medio de una disminución de la fecundidad, la 
política contempla los dos niveles, e l macro-social y el familiar; 
uno y otro dentro de un enfoque educativo hacia, la responsabilidad 
A nivel de la sociedad e l Estado ha lanzado una amplia campana 
socio-cultural en favor de la Paternidad Responsable por medio de 
la ley 75 de 1968, 
Se busca reducir la ilegitimidad, aliviando así en parte el 
problema demográfico. 
Al nivel del individuo y de la familia y como tarea propia del 
Ministerio de Salud Pública se prevea, dentro de los programas 
materno-infantiles, e l suministro de la información y los 
servicios médicos de planificación familiar, tarea que cumplen 
igualmente el Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales y la 
Caja Nacional de Previsión Social." 
(Gustavo Pérez Ramírez, "La Política de Población en Colombia, 
al Término de la Década del 60", citing Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, "Planes y Programas de Desarrollo 1969/72, Capítulo I" 
¿4/ Quantitative targets for reductions in fer t i l i ty rates have been 
cited for a few Caribbean countries. (iVferia L. García, "Informe sobre 
• el estado de los programas de planificación familiar en América Latina 
1968," CELADE Serie A, 97.) These targets, however, seem to have 
been formulated by the family planning programmes for administrative 
purposes to show expected results of coverage of a target number 




When one descends from the level of policy declarations to examine 
what has actually been done, in the name of population policy or otherwise, 
the differences between national positions become less evident. The 
practical policy has been one of laissez faire, combined with varying 
degrees of public support for family planning activit ies. Migration 
policy, once the only active component in national population policies, 
has received very l i t t l e attention in recent years, except in the 
Caribbean countries, so that, in practice, population policy has become 
increasingly equated with receptivity to family planning. The process 
has been recently described and justified as followst 
"Los primeros pasos casi siempre fueron dados por iniciativa 
privada o entidades del mismo carácter que, generalmente se crearon 
específicamente para el f in con apoyo económico de organismos inter-
nacionales, sin encontrar mayor oposición de los Gobiernos respectivos. 
Y esto de no oponerse y dejar para ver las reacciones, no deja de ser 
una política bastante prudente, dadas las circunstancias. A medida 
que los servicios y programas privados fueron demostrando que tenían 
aceptación y que cumplían una necesidad no ofrecida por los gobiernos 
o autoridades gubernamentales, éstas fueron, poco a poco, y con grandes 
temores entrando a participar con la bandera de que el Estado debía 
ejercer control en una actividad que debía ser mirada con sumo cuidado 
por las implicancias médicas, sociales, económicas y morales que podía 
tener. Todo esto parecería confirmar las apreciaciones precedentes en 
el sentido de que ha habido y sigue habiendo temor a la definición 
abierta y franca, en muchos casos no por falta de convicción en las 
bondades del programa, sino por el posible mal uso que sectores de 
oposición gubernamental podrían hacer de estas medidas para criticarlas 
y atacarlas sin tener, generalmente, elementos de juicio suficientes ni 
para justificar ni para rechazar estas políticas. 
45/ Carlos A. Uriarte, "Información sobre la Situación de las Políticas", 





Both the laisseft faIre approach and the identification of 
population policy with family planning have been criticized from 
several quite different points of view; 
(1) It is argued that the attainment of a zero population 
growth rate in the shortest possible time is essential and that family 
s 
planning, as now defined and practiced, is an ineffective means to this 
end, diverting attention from the need for more drastic measures of 
control. This point of view has hardly been represented at a l l in 
Latin America as yet, but has been advanced forcefully by Kingsley Davis 
and others, with reference to the world as a whole, including the countries 
that now have relatively low rates of increase.^/ 
(2) It i s argued that population control i s undesirable, that 
family planning is an a l l too effective means of accomplishing i t , and 
that the way in which family planning is being introduced in Latin America 
means that the national authorities are abdicating control over national 
policy in favour of international organizations and Governments acting 
for the furtherance of their own interests. 
(3) It is argued that the demographic trends themselves, and the 
probable influence on them of the rapid expansion of family planning 
activities have implications for future development that policy makers 
and development planners cannot afford to continue to neglect. This point 
of view takes i t for granted that policy should not be limited to 
population control or to family planning, but that family planning is a 
46/ Kingsley Davis, "Política de Población? ¿Tendrán Exito los 
Programas Actuales?", Demografía y Economía, 8, 1969- (Original 
English version published in Science, 10 November 19670 The same 
arguments were reiterated in a paper presented to the 1970 Latin 
American Regional Conference on Populations "Orígenes de las 




47 / desirable form of sectoral action within a broader policy.— 
• i 
(d) Objectives and instruments of a, population policy 
The preceding discussion indicates that public activities intended 
to influence demographic variables wil l not wait upon the formulation of 
development policies capable of serving as a framework and that nothing 
i 
i s gained by defining population policy * so broadly as tjo make i t co-extensive 
with development policy. Under present conditions, population policy 
must aim at the reconciliation of three broad objectives?(l) to contribute 
to the enhancement of human welfare and human rights at the level of the 
family and individual; (2) to influence population growth, age distribution 
47/ "Para aproximarnos a lo que proponemos definir como política de 
población, podemos comenzar por descartar lo que nosotros, numerosos 
latinoamericanos y, sorprendentemente, algunos norteamericanos creemos 
que no es. Nos referimos, claro está, a las acciones de planificación 
familiar que en la actualidad se desarrollan en todos los países 
latinoamericanos. Estas acciones las descalificamos como política 
de población, aun en el caso que se dieran - cosa que aún no ocurre 
en ningún país de la región - dentro de un plan coherente, como parte 
de una política de salud . . . " la planificación familiar se convierte 
en uno de los elementos a ser considerados dentro de iona política de 
población . . . Es por esto que consideramos altamente negativa la 
posición que, en general han adoptado en América Latina los encargados 
de la planificación económica y social de ignorar - no evaluando los 
efectos tanto demográficos coto económicos - las acciones de 
planificación familiar que se llevan adelante en todos los países de 
la región. Esta actitud de avestruz puede reservarles grandes 
sorpresas en plazos relativamente cortos. Compilaciones hechas por 
el Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (CELADE),j que indudablemente 
reflejan de manera incompleta lo que ocurre en la: realidad, reve3Lan 
que a fines de 1969 existían en la región más de 1 000 clínicas 
anti-conceptivas, de las cuales el 72 por ciento operaba en servicios 
gubernamentales. El número de clínicas existentes.a fines de ese año 
representó un aumento de 43 por ciento sobre las oue se encontraban 
en funcionamiento a fines de 1968.» (Carmen A. Mró, "Política de 
Población; Qué? Por qué? Rara qué? Cómo?.) ¡ 
This source cites the notable decline in the Chilean birth 
rate during the 1960s as evidence of the effects' of a family 
planning prograrame,. embarked upon within the public health service 
and without any^overt population control objectives. The. same 
evidence has been presented by an authority on family planning both 
t© refute Kingsley Davis and to argüe in favour of the laissez 
faire approachs "Con sigilo o sin estridencias, por lo menos, 
debería iniciar el programa, limitándose a poner, tos métodos anti-




and geographical distribution so as to make them as compatible as 
possible with accelerated development and with more equitable distribution 
ôf the fruits of development5 (3) to enhance understanding of demographic 
trends among political leaders, planners, and the public in general, and 
to ensure that these trends are more adequately taken into account in al l 
areas of policy and planning. It has already been indicated that the 
range of instruments at hand for these purposes is narrow, and that the 
inclusion within population policy of many of the instruments theoretically 
applicable is ruled out by prevailing values or by the subjection of these 
instruments to other purposes. 
47/ (Continued) 
emplearlos. Son tantas que, en las fases incisles, cabe prescindir 
de toda motivación y, particularmente, de la educación de masa que 
está erizada de peligro. Es ella la que despierta antagonismo» Por 
si sola esa acción pone en evidencia e incita la demanda social de 
regulación. Llega a hacerse tan incontenible como para que no se 
atrevan a contrariarla la Iglesia ni los políticos. A. esta altura 
procede quizá pedir un pronunciamiento del Gobierno y, en todo caso, 
impulsar la educación y la motivación. . . . Dada la prodigalidad 
relativa de la ayuda internacional - que suele ser forzoso disimular 
en cierto grado - no son de temer por el momento, las estrecheces de 
recursos monetarios.11 (Hernán Romero, "América Latina, Chile y las 
Políticas de Población".) José Vera, "Población y Desarrollos Notas 
para una Política de Población en América latina", places a somewhat 
different emphasis on the place of family planning in development 
policy and its justifications; "En resumen, una política de 
población para América Latina debería incluir dos tipos básicos de 
acción; (a) programas educativos y, en casos extremos, de subsidios, 
destinados a proveer acceso real a la oportunidad de decidir 
conscientemente sobre el tamaño de sus familias a aquellas parejas 
que puedan verse afectadas por situaciones de desequilibrio 
demográficos y, (b) reorientación de los programas nacionales de 
desarrollo en función del empleo pleno de la fuerza de trabajo. Es 
probable que una combinación adecuada de estos dos tipos de acción 
en América Latina contribuya al cumplimiento simultáneo de varios fines 
útiles; (a) aliviar el sufrimiento de millones de familias a las 
cuales el progreso de las técnicas de la salud ha otorgado el obsequio 
de una menor mortalidad, rápidamente negada en la práctica por el 
retraso de los restantes componentes del nivel de vida; (b) incrementar 
la racionalidad y en más de un sentido "humanizar" la planificación 
del desarrollo, mediante el simple expediente de organizaría en función 
del desarrollo de los seres humanos antes que de las cosas que los 
rodean y sirven y, (c) consolidar la obsolescencia de la idea de que 
la abundancia de recursos humanos en una sociedad puede ser la causa 
de su subdesarrollo." 
/ ( i ) Instruments 
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( i ) Instruments intended to enhance family welfare and act on the 
rate of population increase through the fert i l i ty variable. "Family planning 
has come to mean education in the advantages of spacing and limiting the 
number of children combined with demonstration of contraceptive techniques 
and supply of contraceptives, generally within public health programmes 
and directed almost exclusively to the female partners in regularly 
constitued familes. Ideally public policy should reflect a broader 
interpretation of the term, and enhanced abil ity to plan the number of 
children should be combined with enhanced ability by the family to plan 
for the livelihood, consumption, housing, education and participation 
in local and national community l i f e of i t s members. Alleviation of 
the burden represented by uncontrolled f er t i l i ty can strengthen family 
capacity to exercise foresight in other areas but does not guarantee i t . 
This consideration, however, points to problems of public capacity to 
apply a broader family policy, and of the compatibility of social and 
economic structures with a more participatory role by the low-income 
family, that are too complex to be discussed here. 
Even in i t s present narrow interpretation, family planning is 
better suited to the enhancement of human rights and family welfare than 
to demographic rationalization. For the latter purpose, i ts effects 
are hard to predict, as the differing opinions of specialists cited 
above indicate, but whatever the effects , they will be irreversible and 
hardly manipulable in terms of any short or medium term quantitative 
objectives that public policy might set. The effects wi l l derive from, 
the aggregate decisions of millions of families, or simply of the women« 
A decision by the State to curtail family planning services on the basis 
of a judgment that population increase is shrinking too rapidly would be 
inacceptabie in terms of the human rights justification of the programmes, 
and in any case would be ineffective, except in relation to the families 
too poor or too lacking in initiative to seek private sources of 
contra ceptives J ^ 
48/ In Chile the National Health Service has fixed a maximum quota for 
installation of IUD's of 15 per cent of women in the fert i le age 
groups (100 per cent of women hospitalized because of induced abortionsj 
40 per cent of women giving birth in the hospitals, 10 per cent of 
other women). This quota seems to have been motivated in part by 
uneasiness over the rate of decline in the Chilean birth rate, and to 
have led to curtailment of family planning services in some hospitals 
.once their quota had been passed. , „ ... /Present family 
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Present family planning programmes in latin America depend almost 
exclusively on two contraceptive techniques; the "pi l l " and the IUD. 
Both have advantages over earlier techniques, particularly for mass 
application, but neither is entirely satisfactory, and very great changes 
in contraceptive technology can be expected during the coming desade. 
It should be kept in mind that family planning programmes account for 
only a part, and generally a minor part, of the use of contraceptive 
techniques in the c i t ies . The CELADE investigations among urban women 
20-50 years, of age, married'or "convivientes" carried out in late 
1963 and early 1964 revealed the following percentages using some 
contraceptive techniques Buenos Aires 84.5, Rio de Janeiro 38*2, 
Bogotá 36.6, San José 56.8, Panamá 30.7, Caracas 62.4 and Mexico 30.8. 
At that time, the IUD had not yet been introduced, use of oral contraceptives 
was only beginning, and family planning services in the cit ies were 
either non-existent or of very limited scope. Private practice of 
contraception is by now undoubtedly much more extensive, and has shifted 
toward more dependable techniques. 
In the polemic over population policy well-known assertions 
that expenditures on family planning, considered as developmental 
investments, have a yield many times greater than other investments 
have been f lat ly contradicted by assertions that the resources devoted 
to family planning would be much better used on directly productive 
investments. There is practically no information, however, on the 
total sums devoted to family planning in Latin American countries, 
on the extent to which resources used for family planning are of a 
kind convertible to other purposes, on costs per client, or on costs 
/ o f "avoiding" 
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4 9 / of "avoiding" a birth.™ At present, a high proportion of the direct 
costs are met from external sources that would not be prepared to provide 
the same funds for other purposes,^/ and a high proportion of the 
infra structural and personnel costs are indistinguishable from the over-all 
costs of the health services sponsoring the family planning programmes. 
49/ One source estimates the cost of avoiding each birth (medical, 
educational and organizational costs of a family planning 
programme) at US$ 10, and the annual cost for Latin America as 
a whole of avoiding 2,000*000 births, sufficient to bring the rate 
of population increase down from 2.9 per cent in 1970 to 2.3 per 
cent in 1980 at. $20,000,000. The basis for the $10 estimate is 
not stated. (W. Brand, "Política de Población para América Latina".) 
The cost of "protection" of a couple for one year has recently been 
calculated at US$6.95 for Chile; similar calculations for Asian 
countries reach lower figures, the differences being roughly 
proportional to differences in per capita incomes. (Warren Robinson,, 
,A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Selected National Family Programmes, 
cited in Bernard Berelson, "The Present State of Family Planning 
Programs", Studies in Family Planning, 57, September 1970.) 
Calculations have also been made of the actual and potential private 
market for oral contraceptives in Mexico. It is estimated that 
3 million families (representing about 4.5 million "eligible" women) 
have expenditures over 1,000 pesos (US$ 80) per month and that 2 per 
cent of this expenditure would be sufficient to provide oral 
contraceptives at existing market prices of 10-20 pesos per monthly 
cycle. At present sales levels, about 11 per cent of this potential 
nsrket is realized (5.4 cycles distributed in 1968 per 100 women 
aged 15-44). Alfred D. Sollins, "Commercial Production and Distribution 
of Contraceptives", Reports on Population/Family Planning, 4, 
June 1970. 
50/ USAID obligations for population and family planning activities 
in the Latin American region, chanelled through various public and 
private organizations* rose from $2,324*000 in 19¿7 to $7,924,656 
in 1968. The Ford Foundation, up to the beginning of October 1968 
had granted about $4,000,000 to Latin American institutions for 
research and training related to population. Other Governments 
outside the region, as well as other foundations, have provided 
smaller sums. (Agency for International Development, The Office 
of the War on Hunger, Population Service, Population Program 
Assistance, Washington, D.C., September 1968T) Foreign aid funds 
allocated by the U.S. Congress exclusively for population and family 
planning activities in the world as a whole outside the United States 
amounted to $ 50,000,000 for 1969, $ 75,000,000 for 1970, and 
$ 100,000,000 for 1971, or about 2.3 per cent of o f f i c ia l U.S. aid 
b to less-developed countries for the'f iscal year 1970. 
(Philander P. Claxton'Jr. "La Política de los Estados Unidos 
respecto de los Asuntos de Población y Planificación Familiar".) 
/As long 
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As long as the programmes simply respond to demand i t does not seem that 
per capita costs need be very high; to the, extent t o which educational 
campaigns and extension to the rural population are envisaged, such 
costs would inevitably r i s e . Even i f the opportunity to,, use earmarked 
external funds disappears, or i s re jected as incompatible with national 
control over the programmes, i t does not appear probable that the costs 
o f family planning programmes expanding at a judic ious rate in response 
to demand would require a rea l ly serious diversion o f public resources 
from other developmental purposes. At the same time, such programmes 
cannot expect an overriding p r i o r i t y in the competition f o r publ ic funds, 
and they are l i k e l y to share the vulnerabi l i ty o f a l l the newer so c ia l 
and economic programmes to budgetary cuts when public resources f a l l 
below expecta t i ons . 
I t i s well-known that up to the present abortion has been the most 
widely used means o f f e r t i l i t y l imitat ion in the Latin American urban 
population, as in many other parts o f the world. Reliable s t a t i s t i c s are 
naturally lacking, since the only abortions coming to public attention are 
the fa i lures requiring intervention by the public health serv ices , but 
recourse to abortion seems to be widespread among a l l soc ia l strata® 
According to the 1963-1964 CELADE invest igations the percentage of women 
admitting to one or more induced abortions reached 10.3 in Rio de Janeiro, 
8.0 in Buenos Aires , and 7 .1 in Mexico. Among the upper and middle strata 
i t probably serves mainly as a las t resort when contraception f a i l s , but 
among the poorer strata i t i s the pr inc ipal means used. Up to the present 
no important sector o f opinion in Latin America has proposed legal ized 
abortion as a legit imate means of family planning or population contro l . 
On the contrary, many of the i n i t i a l family planning programmes have been 
j u s t i f i e d primarily as a means o f re l iev ing women o f the need to resort 
to abort ion. 
Whether th is r e j e c t i on w i l l prevai l permanently i s problematic, in 
sp i te o f the strong re l ig ious sentiments behind i t , in view of the wide 
acceptance o f abortion by the women themselves and the trend toward 
l ega l i za t i on o f abortion in the res t of the world. The danger t o the 
health o f the pregnant women p r a c t i c a l l y disappears when the operation 
/ i s carried 
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is carried out in a clinic and new techniques promise to make the 
operation increasingly simple and inexpensive. The legal prohibition . 
of abortion, as long as i t cannot be effectively enforced, has justifiably 
been criticized as a form of discrimination against the poor. Women who can 
pay high fees can obtain abortions under safe conditions. The remainder 
also obtain abortions when they want them, but under conditions that 
produce an appalling amount of suffering and sickness, and many avoidable 
deaths. The main remaining objections' are that abortion, as a recourse 
that does not cal l for foresight, contributes nothing to responsible 
parenthood and the developmentslly favourable attitudes supposed to be 
associated with family planning; also, that the woman depending on this 
alone might have to resort to i t very frequently.*^/ As the use of 
contraceptives continues to spread, the main role of abortion whether 
legally or i l legal ly , will probably come to be the repairing of 
contraceptive failures and the avoiding of consequences of casual sexual 
unions. 
Sterilization has become an important technique of family planning 
programmes in India and Pakistan (mainly of men) and in Puerto Rico 
(mainly of women); in parts of the former countries payments are offered 
to persons submitting to sterilization. In the latin American family 
planning programmes sterilization has been l i t t l e used. Since i t is 
normally offered to and accepted by only persons who have already produced 
a l l the children they want, i ts role in fert i l i ty reduction can be no 
more than supplementary to contraception.^/ 
£1/ "Tengo reservas respecto a su legalización» Sitre ellas destacan 
el fatalismo de nuestra gente que prefiere afrontar e l hecho 
consumado a tonar medidas preventivas y que, a poco de interrumpido 
el embarazo, la mujer recupera, de ordinario, su fecundidad. Podría pro-
ducirse así una cadena sin f in inconveniente por si misma y muy gravosa 
para nuestros servicios de atención médica.11 (Hernán Romero, op .c i t , ) 
¿2/ According to the 1963-1964 GELADE investigation the percentage of women 
in the larger cities, who have undergone sterilization, although small, 
is not negligible % about 6 per cent in Caracas, Rio de Janeiro «and 
San José; 2 per cent in Mexico City, 1 per cent in Bogotá. Panama, 
however, i s an exception: according to a recent study 20 per cent of 
the women, in the conjugal unions surveyed had been sterilized. The 
effect of sterilization has been estimated at an average reduction of 
25 per cent in the aggregate fer t i l i ty of all women in conjugal union. 
See Robert B. Hartford and George C. Myers, Esterilización femenina en 




The nearly universal affirmation of the right of the family to 
determine the number and spacing of children, and the more qualified 
affirmation of the duty of the State to offer effective means for the 
family to act on its decision, leaves open the delicate question of the 
legitimacy of State activities to influence the family's decision, once 
the State has adopted objectives concerning population increase. Compulsion 
can be ruled out on practical grounds as well as moral considerations; 
i t is hard to imagine the public authorities anywhere in latin America 
invoking penal sanctions against parents, let alone compulsory abortion.^/ 
In principle, persuasive and dissuasive measures would be legitimate. 
The State already intervenes in many ways in the affairs of the family, 
through educational laws; social security provisions; and taxes, subsidies, 
etc. designed to promote, regulate, or discourage different forms of 
consumption and saving. It would be i l logical to expect reproductive 
patterns, once these are conceived to be matters of importance to the 
society as a whole, to be l e f t to the judgement of the family without 
any attempt at public influence on the decision. In practice, mtiy 
present family planning programmes within public health services rely on a 
.influence on the women .when ..she: is ...most likely to be 
open to such influence - immediately after having given birth. 
Various sources have proposed a wide range of measures intended to 
influence reproductive behaviour short of compulsion.^^ 
53/ Penal sanctions and compulsory abortion have been seriously proposed 
to combat illegitimate births, as the least desirable contributions 
to the birth rate, but even here such sanctions would be neither-
enforceable nor socially tolerable. 
¿4/. A leading authority on family planning, after summarizing proposals 
put.forward or adopted in various countries outside Latin America, 
comments; " . . .not only are there ethical issues . . . and polit ical 
problems, but the practical problems are enormous. As has been said, 
i f a country could administer such complex systems for demographic 
ends, i t probably would not need to do so in the f i rs t place« . . . . 
It i s , I think, fair to 6ay that the f ie ld has been diligently 
looking for something to do 1beyond family planning1, something 
practicable and ethical, economic, and with some chance of effectiveness, 
even on an experimental or demonstration basis. On the whole we have 




In the s p e c i f i c circumstances o f the Latin American countries , however, 
p rac t i ca l l y a l l o f them seem to be either o f very minor importance-, 
inacceptable in terms of values,, inappl icable , or excessively expensive« 
Proposals to do away with l ega l r e l i c s of past p o l i c i e s favouring large 
fami l i es , such as prizes to women having more than a given number of 
children and laws prohibit ing contraceptive sales and advice, are 
sensible but not very important. Proposals to do away with income tax 
exemptions f o r dependent children would a f f e c t only the upper-income 
minorities.paying such taxes , who already contro l their f e r t i l i t y . 
Proposals f o r punitive taxation on families having more than a given 
number o f children would, i f enforceable, have a disastrous e f f e c t on 
the l i v i n g conditions of children already born to low-income fami l i es , 
without any guarantee o f bringing about a s ign i f i cant reduction in 
future f e r t i l i t y . Ih any case , such taxation would be completely 
unenforceable among the urban marginal population, the rural population, 
or the unwed mothers. Proposals to raise the minimum legal age f o r 
marriage or to promote late marriages by tax advantages to bachelors would 
in a l l probabi l i ty have no e f f e c t on the reproductive behaviour o f the 
strata now characterized by very high f e r t i l i t y , in the absence of cultural 
changes bringing the age o f i n i t i a t i o n of sexual relations, into correspondence 
with thé minimum age f o r marriage. In other strata , the e f f e c t on f e r t i l i t y 
would be of small importance, since with contraception generally practiced and 
r e l a t i v e l y c lear ob jec t ives f o r family s i z e , b irths would be postponed 
rather than avoided. The provision of public payments f o r l a t e marriage 
or f o r the spacing of children within marriage would be hard to administer, 
expensive, and unpopular. Universalization o f retirement pensions and 
other bene f i t s , so as to eliminate the " soc ia l secur i ty" incentive o f 
having many children f o r support in old age, could not be financed 
through a contributory system, at the present income leve ls o f the strata 
most in need of such secur i ty , and would be far beyond the f inanc ia l 
capacity o f the State. In any case , the relevance o f such a measure to 
reproductive behaviour i s questionable, however desirable i t might be f o r 
other reasons. Publicly financed mass propaganda campaigne in support of 




preceded by a broad public debate leading to a sufficient degree of 
consensus on the nature of the population problem and i t s policy 
implications? and i f informed by a more adequate understanding of the 
motivations of reproductive behaviour in different social strata than 
now ©btains. Otherwise, such a campaign might be self-defeating in terms 
of the resistances aroused. 
To sum up, the capacity of the State to influence reproductive 
behaviour directly seems to be limited; this would apply to measures 
intended to stimulate higher f er t i l i ty as much as to measures intended 
to depress f er t i l i ty , particularly i f the intention is to change the 
direction o f trends in family behaviour» Various Governments in Western 
Europe have tried for many years to promote higher birth rates through 
exhortation, incentives such as family allowances, restrictions on 
contraceptive sales and advice, etc. The impact on reproductive 
behaviour seems to have been insignificant. 
( i i ) Instruments intended to influence population increase and 
quality through migration across national boundaries. The changing currents 
of international migration demonstrate how the developmental implications 
of demographic trends depend on changes in the patterns of economic growth 
and international inter-dependence. Up to the 1920s Europe, with a much 
smaller population than the present, seemed to be an inexhaustible* 
source of migrants to Latin America and other thinly populated parts of 
the world. This stream has practically dried up, both because of fu l l 
employment in the former countries of emigration and because of the 
declining relative attractiveness of opportunities in the countries: of 
immigration. The slackening demand for-unskilled and semi-skilled labour 
in Latin America as well as in the high-income countries means that latin 
America has no interest in admitting immigrants of the types that would 
s t i l l be available, and has almost no possibility of relieving the domestic 
over-supply of labour by encouraging emigration. International migration 
in relation to Latin America has lost practically a l l of its importance 
for the quantity of national population, and is very unlikely to regain 
i t . At the same time, the importance of international migration for the 




highly unfavourable to Latin American development. Ability to attract to 
Latin America immigrants possessing the skills and professional, 
qualifications that are heeded for the next stages df development is weak. 
The ability of the high-income countries to attract from Latin America 
emigrants possessing such qualifications - particularly engineers,. 
physicians and nurses - has up to the present been strong. This problem 
has attracted international attention under the name of "brain drain", 
and a number of policy instruments have been proposed to reverse the 
trend. As in the case of the measures discussed above in relation to 
reproductive behaviour, most of these seem likely to be ineffective, 
inacceptable in terms of rights, excessively expensive, or inapplicable 
in the absence of broader changes in economic and social structures. 
Such measures include: provision of salary levels and opportunities to 
acquire consumer goods (particularly automobiles) matching those offered 
by the high-income countries; prohibition of the emigration of persons 
possessing needed skills, or the imposition of high taxes on such 
migration; requirement that graduates of national professional and 
technical training institutions work for a fixed period in national 
programmes to compensate for the costs of their training; reform of the 
training institutions themselves to bring their output into closer 
correspondence with national needs and overcome its dependence on the 
models, demands and incentives of the high-income countries. - It is also 
possible that present economic and social difficulties and slackening demand 
for professionals in the countries that have exerted the strongest pull, will 
reduce the importance of the problem as far as Latin America is concerned« 
( i i i ) Geographical and occupational distribution of thepopulat:ions 
objectives and instruments. The preceding pages have touched repeatedly 
on the relationships between population growth and its redistribution by 
geographical areas and sectors of economic activity within countries. 
For the short and medium term, the possibilities for planning of public 
action so as to control population redistribution in consonance with a 
determined development strategy seem to be more favourable than in the 
case of population growth. The range of instruments at the disposal of 




aim at population redistribution objectives in the choice and manipulation 
of instruments. 
It has also been indicated that measures bearing on population 
redistribution are more likely to be planned within a context of regional 
development policy, urban development policy, or rural development policy 
than as parts of a comprehensive population policy, although the latter 
solution would not be out of the question. In this examination of the 
instruments of a population policy i t will thus be sufficient to stress 
the potential importance of the selection of objectives and instruments 
fitted to the circumstances of each country, and to take note of a wide 
consensus that in most countries of the region the next stages of 
development call for more decentralized patterns of urban growth and 
distribution of economic activities. 
(iv) Information needed for population policy. Demographic 
information has three main sources: censuses, vital statistics, registers 
and sample surveys. All of these sources have serious deficiencies in 
relation to policy needs. Some of the shortcomings, are inherent in the 
methods of data collection, wherever they are used, and in the recalcitrance 
of some of the phenomena to definitions simple and uniform enough for easy 
recording. Others derive from the lamentably low priorities given by most 
latin American Governments to the careful collection and prompt 
dissemination of demographic information. Sti l l others belong to the 
traits of underdevelopment s illiteracy, marginality, rural isolation, 
political instability and deficient public administrative machinery set 
limits on national capacity to produce reliable demographic or other 
statistics. The second shortcoming is more readily remediable than the 
others; i t requires only a moderate change in priorities for use of. public 
resources, some attention to training of staff and, above al l , a clearcut 
demand for better information from political leaders and planners. 
Both in individual countries and in regional organizations, a great 
deal of effort and ingenuity has been devoted to techniques for the 
quantification of demographic and other factors related to development 
on the basis of whatever information is at hand. Under the circumstances, 




that more is known than is actually the case, and may have helped to 
perpetuate the low priority given to the painstaking and expensive 
collection of basic data. When estimates of this kind acquire authority 
by repetition from source to source without the caveats and methodological 
explanations supplied by their originators, and when they are incorporated 
in plans, i t might sometimes be suspected that an imaginary country 
concerning which there is exhaustive information is being diagnosed and 
planned for , rather than a real country concerning which there is l i t t l e 
55/ 
reliable information,—f 
Population censuses. Over a long period, inter-American organizations 
have tried to strengthen and institutionalise the practice of taking 
censuses at the beginning to each decade. The high point of success came 
in the 1950 round; 18 out of the 20 Latin American republics (all except 
Peru and Uruguay) completed censuses at some time between 1947 and 1953-
In the I960 round, Bolivia, Cuba and Haiti failed to carry out censuses, 
and i t appears that under-enumeration and delays in tabulations were 
more widespread than in 1950. It is probable that in the 1970 round 
the number of omissions will be about the same. It is naturally the 
countries with lowest incomes and highest percentages of rural population 
that find i t hardest to make the considerable Concentrated effort needed 
to set up a functioning census apparatus every ten years, although most 
of them have finally managed to do so. The censuses have been affected 56/ 
by varying degrees of under-enumeration,™' and by doubtful rel iabil ity 
of answers to some questions as recorded by untrained census-takers. 
55/ The report of the :inter-agency team on employment policy in 
Colombia, repeatedly stresses the d i f f i cu l t ies for its work 
presented by inadequate statistics and comments that "in some 
respects there has been an over-investment in analysis and an.' 
under-investment in basic collection of reliable statistics". 
(Towards Full Employment, op»cit . , para0 929.) 
¿6 / A number of census evaluations carried out in CELADE contain 
calculations of percentages of under-enumeration; for example, 
3.46 for Colombia in 1964> 2.3 for Ecuador in 1962, and 2.9 for 
Mexico in I960. Real under-enumeration, however, may be much, 
higher, i f probable failure to cover tribal populations and some 
of the more isolated and dispersed rural population nuclei is taken 
into account. See G.Mortara, "Evaluación de la' información censal para 
América Latina", in Demografía y Salud Pública en América Latina, 
Milbank Memorial Fund, 1964. 
/A s t i l l 
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A s t i l l more serious shortcoming has been slowness and incompleteness 
57/ 
in tabulating and publishing the datqa—' 
The censuses are the main sources for basic demographic information 
and projections. For year-to-year figures demographers are dependent on 
the trends revealed by successive censuses. When data from one census 
are more inaccurate than data from another to an unknown degree, and 
when the most recent census is several years in the past, the .margin of 
possible error widens. While methods of making projections have been 
continually refined in recent years and cross-checking against other 
sources of information offers some protection, i t should be kept in 
mind that most population figures for 1970, as well as projections for 
the future, s t i l l derive from censuses conducted around 1950 and I960. 
The results may be tolerably reliable for population size, rate of 
increase, and age distribution at the national level, but can go far 
astray in regard to population redistribution within a country. This 
limitation is sometimes forgotten when non-demographers try to relate 
population trends to economic and social trends that can be measured through 
indicators collected year by year. 
Vital statistics and- other continuing series collected by the public 
administration. The possibility of presenting reliable birth rates, death 
rates and nuptiality rates, and of cross-checking census.-*!erived information 
on population increase, has up to the present, depended oh the maintenance 
of complete vital statistics registration. It is questiona&Le whether 
this objective can be attained until a country has reaqhed a certain 
level of urbanization, literacy, diffusion of property, and availability 
of social services requiring documentary evidence on the constitution 
of the family and the origin of the individual. Accurate statistical 
information is then a by-product of the social uses of the registration 
system. According to United Nations criteria - which have been characterized 
as excessively generous - vital statistics registration is incomplete 
in 15 out of 26 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
57/ In one case, detailed and complete results for the census of I960 




Sample surveys. The most practicable and flexible means of 
obtaining up-to-date infornation on internal migration, patterns of 
urbanization, family levels of living, incomes, occupations, attitudes a 
and practices regarding f er t i l i ty , and many other questions important to 
policy-making, is the sample survey. The shortcomings of vital statistics 
registration, mentioned above, have also led to promising experiments in 
the use of this technique (through continuous registration in a sample of 
the population, divorced from legal and administrative purposes) for the 
obtaining of more accurate vital s t a t i s t i c s . ^ / The need for systematic 
sample surveys and for the setting up of national institutions equipped 
to carry out such surveys has been reiterated during the past two decades, 
but up to the present no Government in the region has provided the minimum 
resources needed to make the sample survey a dependable policy instrument, 
although several countries may be on the point of doing so i f their 
present plans are carried out and continuity i s maintained. An important 
number of sample surveys of demographic questions have been made, 
including surveys of internal migration to capital c i t ies (Lima and 
Santiago); of urban mortality; and of attitudes toward fert i l i ty among 
urban and rural women of different countries, but they have been 
organized mainly by regional institutions such as CEEADE or by universities 
and have been financed mainly through grants from foundations and other 
institutions outside the region .^ / 
¿8/ Forest E. lander, "New Approaches to the Measurement of Mortality". 
Two experimental sample surveys of vital statistics have been carried 
out: One in an urban area (Guanabara, Brazil) and one in a rural area 
(Cauquenes, Chile). See United Nations, Guanabara Demographic Pilot 
Survey, Population Studies N°35i and CELADE, Encuesta Demográfica 
Experimental. Cauquenes3 Santiago de Chile, 1968. 
¿9/ The migration surveys are reported on in Encuesta sobre inmigración en 
el Gran Santiago (CELADE, Serie A., N°15) and in Encuesta de Inmigración 
de Ltoa Metropolitana (DINEC, Lima, Nos.l, 2 . . . ) . The mortality surveys 
are reported on in Ruth Rice Puffer and G.Wynne Griff ith, Patterns of 
Urban Mortality, Report of the Interi-America n Investigation on Morta l i tyP 
Pan American Health Organization, Scientific Publications N°151, 
September 1967. The surveys of urban fer t i l i ty covered Bogotá, Buenos 
Aires, Caracas, Mexico City, Panama, Rio de Janeiro, and San José; 
surveys of rural f er t i l i ty have been completed in Chile and Colombia, 
and are to be extended to most of the countries covered by the urban 
surveys. 

